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Questioning Law Enforcement 




Law enforcement interviews are sometimes viewed as 
one of the least intrusive and least objectionable investigative 
techniques in the government’s counterterrorism arsenal.1 In 
theory, a law enforcement agent’s voluntary request for 
information from an individual for a counterterrorism 
investigation, or a border agent’s questioning of a person 
returning to the United States after traveling abroad, only 
minimally impinges on privacy and individual rights. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) interviews do not involve extreme 
interrogation methods, the imposition of criminal sanctions for 
speech, or the use of covert investigative tools hidden from 
public view—all policies that have attracted considerable 
public and scholarly attention. 
Yet law enforcement interviews of U.S. Muslims in the 
terrorism context2 involve greater coercion and stigma than 
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 1  See infra note 16. 
 2  Throughout this piece, I focus on law enforcement interviews in the U.S. 
Muslim community, given the particular focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts on 
Islamic extremist violence. Where I discuss a study, policy, or legal case that focuses on 
an ethnic community that substantially overlaps with U.S. Muslims (such as “Arab 
Americans” or “South Asians”), I make the distinction clear. Otherwise, I use the term 
U.S. Muslims with the understanding that much of the analysis would also apply to 
overlapping ethnic communities. In addition, in referring to “counterterrorism” 
interviews or interviews in the “terrorism context,” I refer not just to interviews within 
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prevailing accounts recognize. Interviews are startlingly 
common: some estimates suggest that the FBI, for instance, 
has questioned hundreds of thousands of U.S. Muslims.3 FBI 
and CBP interviews alike have elicited widespread concern 
among U.S. Muslims as a result of the coercion involved, the 
content of the questioning, and the basis for interviewee 
selection. As personal, direct encounters between individuals in 
the U.S. Muslim community and the U.S. government, 
interviews are especially likely to inform targeted individuals’ 
and communities’ sense of “belonging” and inclusion as ethnic 
and religious minorities in the United States. 
Where law enforcement agents select individuals for 
questioning primarily on the basis of their speech, associations, 
or other expressive activities protected by the First 
Amendment, interviews raise special concern. For instance, 
according to recent congressional testimony from a Muslim 
civil rights organization, the FBI questioned a computer 
programmer after he posted “political articles from mainstream 
news sources on his Facebook page”—approaching him at his 
workplace in front of colleagues and supervisors and 
potentially jeopardizing his job.4 The FBI contacted another 
man for questioning after a local newspaper published his 
nonviolent comments about the political situation in Pakistan.5 
Tabbaa v. Chertoff was a rare case of such targeting to 
actually reach the courts. In Tabbaa, the CBP questioned, 
fingerprinted, photographed, and searched dozens of individuals 
returning to the United States after attending an Islamic 
conference in Toronto, applying the extra screening procedures 
“normally reserved for suspected terrorists.”6 The government 
had no individualized suspicion regarding any of the plaintiffs, 
all U.S. citizens, but carried out these procedures on those 
travelers who told border officials that they had attended the 
Toronto gathering.7 The conference drew over thirteen thousand 
participants and featured prominent Islamic speakers, musical 
  
an explicit terrorism investigation, but to interviews conducted for, or justified by, the 
general purpose of gathering information on potential terrorist threats.  
 3 See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 4 Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications in Law Enforcement 
Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 67 (2010) (statement of 
Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 7 Id. at 92, 94. 
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performances, spiritual reflection, and communal prayer.8 
Border agents questioned plaintiffs about their activities at the 
conference, the content of the lectures, and the reasons they 
attended, and the detentions lasted between four and six hours.9 
The CBP defended itself in Tabbaa by asserting that it 
acted based on information that individuals associated with 
terrorist activities would attend the conference and that the event 
might serve as a “meeting point” to plan terrorist activities or 
“exchange ideas and documents.”10 The agency had ordered border 
agents to ascertain the identities of conference participants, check 
their status on watch lists, and search luggage to find any 
evidence of terrorist plans, documents, or weapons.11 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the measures significantly 
burdened plaintiffs’ freedom of association but ruled that the 
government’s security interests justified the intrusion.12 
Tabbaa was wrongly decided: the court failed to 
question the notion that it was rational—and fair—to stop 
every person returning from a diverse gathering of thirteen 
thousand people on the possibility that she may have met a 
terrorist, and perfunctorily dismissed alternative methods of 
investigation.13 But it appropriately recognized the stigmatic 
harm from the screening measures and applied heightened 
scrutiny to the practice—engaging in a form of review other 
courts have declined to apply in First Amendment challenges 
to law enforcement investigations and surveillance.14 
This article argues for heightened scrutiny of law 
enforcement interviews triggered by protected speech and 
association, which impose a substantial burden on those rights. 
Not all interviews based on First Amendment expression are 
wrong; speech or association may at times be a relevant basis for 
law enforcement inquiry. But the harms from such interviews 
call for careful scrutiny to determine whether a sufficient nexus 
exists between the First Amendment trigger for the scrutiny and 
an actual threat. Interviews based on First Amendment 
expression send a message to affected individuals and 
communities that their expressions of identity and participation 
in the public sphere are devalued, imposing stigma and chilling 
  
 8 Id. at 94. 
 9 Id. at 94, 98, 100. 
 10 Id. at 93.  
 11 Id. at 94. 
 12 Id. at 102-03. 
 13  Id. at 104. 
 14  Id. at 102. 
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expression. And there are historical reasons to question law 
enforcement interviews focused on First Amendment activities: 
in an earlier period of heightened fear over domestic and foreign 
threats, the FBI deliberately used interviews to suppress 
political speech and association by creating the impression that 
“there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”15 
There is now a growing literature on the effects of 
terrorism investigations on expression and association,16 yet the 
scholarship on First Amendment freedom of speech and 
association doctrine related to investigations remains scant. 
Several scholars briefly cite doctrinal obstacles to Free Speech 
Clause challenges to surveillance or investigations before 
turning their attention elsewhere.17 Moreover, the literature on 
law enforcement interviews in the terrorism context is almost 
nonexistent.18 Interviews are rarely the subject of new 
legislation, public announcements, or court challenges that 
attract public and scholarly notice. Even scholars arguing for 
greater protection of civil liberties often mention interviews only 
  
 15 See Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1389 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting internal FBI memo from 1970). 
 16 For examples of post-9/11 scholarship on the First Amendment implications 
of counterterrorism investigations, see Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: 
Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2004); 
David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant 
Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123 (2010); Aziz Z. Huq, The 
Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833 
(2011); Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of 
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004); Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over 
Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, First 
Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free 
Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011); Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government 
Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, 
Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National 
Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105 (2009); Gayle Horn, Note, Online Searches and 
Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735 (2005); Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the Faithful: 
Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism 
Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920 (2008).  
 17  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 153-54; Lininger, supra note 16, at 1266; 
Hussain, supra note 16, at 946-48. 
 18 The primary law review article found focusing on FBI or CBP interviews, 
though not from a First Amendment perspective, is Tracey Maclin, “Voluntary” 
Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a 
Time of Terror, 73 MISS. L.J. 471 (2003); see also Hussain, supra note 16, at 927-32 
(addressing Tabbaa in presenting a free exercise theory for claims against targeting of 
religious expression). 
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to contrast them with more intrusive methods, thereby casting 
interviews as a relatively harmless investigative practice.19 
This article addresses these gaps in the literature. Part 
I contextualizes FBI and CBP interviews of U.S. Muslims and 
describes three concerns they raise: the coercion of FBI and 
CBP encounters, the content of questioning, and the 
discriminatory basis for selection of interviewees. This part 
further argues that neither Fourth Amendment law nor 
internal regulations provides meaningful restrictions on 
interviews. Part II contends that law enforcement interviews 
that involve First Amendment profiling—the selection of an 
individual for law enforcement attention because of political, 
religious, or cultural expression or association—impose 
particularly grave stigmatic costs and chilling effects on 
individuals and communities. This part also maps out two 
separate normative concerns that the practice raises: a 
suppression concern about deliberate government attempts to 
suppress speech through an investigation and an overbreadth 
concern about the scope of an investigation triggered by 
expression, even where there is not an apparent illegitimate 
purpose. I argue that even without a suppression purpose, an 
investigation based on First Amendment profiling raises 
concern both because of the greater risk that hostility to 
expression influenced the scope of the investigation and 
because of the serious harms to individuals and communities. 
Part III argues that courts ought to apply heightened 
scrutiny to interviews based on First Amendment profiling, and 
that existing First Amendment doctrine on free speech and 
association, while inconclusive, offers the potential for courts to do 
so. Some plaintiffs challenging FBI and CBP interviews should be 
able to surmount standing barriers that courts have erected in 
First Amendment cases, and further demonstrate, on the merits, 
substantial harm from investigations. Furthermore, lower courts 
have split as to whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate for 
reviewing First Amendment challenges to law enforcement 
investigations, and I counter the objection that narrow-tailoring 
requirements would impede critical law enforcement interests. 
Plaintiffs are most likely to succeed in challenges to First 
Amendment profiling where they can demonstrate tangible harm, 
  
 19 See Solove, supra note 16, at 175-76 (advocating a warrant requirement for 
government information-gathering implicating First Amendment values, but not in 
voluntary interviews); Fisher, supra note 16, at 673 (contrasting voluntary interviews 
with infiltration of organizations). 
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such as detention, reputational injuries, or economic costs, in 
addition to stigma and chilling effects. 
A few words about the limited nature of my claims are 
in order. I do not contend that the “average” interview based on 
First Amendment profiling will trigger judicial scrutiny or 
establish a violation of the law. It is also beyond question that 
any challenge to law enforcement terrorism investigations will 
need to overcome judicial concerns about second-guessing the 
factual determinations of law enforcement agencies regarding 
the appropriateness of particular investigative measures. Yet 
in the terrorism context, any legal challenge to an investigative 
practice will face significant obstacles. But precisely because 
legal challenges in this area are difficult, any avenue for 
judicial review not foreclosed becomes significant. While I do 
not argue that plaintiffs will usually prevail in challenging 
First Amendment profiling, I do contend that ostensibly 
nonintrusive and unobjectionable law enforcement questioning 
can impose substantial harm on individuals and communities, 
and that the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and 
association offer the potential to contest these harms in an 
important segment of cases. 
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERVIEWS 
Law enforcement agents question individuals for 
national-security purposes in a wide variety of contexts: 
immigration officials interview noncitizens applying for 
citizenship or permanent residency, local police question 
motorists stopped in traffic whose names trigger a watch-list 
match, prosecutors question witnesses before grand juries, and 
investigators interrogate suspects arrested for terrorism 
offenses. This article focuses on two of the most common forms 
of interviews in the counterterrorism context affecting 
immigrants and U.S. citizens alike—FBI interviews of 
individuals approached at home, work, or in their communities, 
and CBP interviews of individuals seeking to reenter the 
United States at airports or land borders after traveling 
abroad. The prevailing view in much of the legal doctrine and 
commentary, sometimes explicit but often unstated, is that 
interviews in either context inflict little harm, at least relative 
to other investigative methods, because they are minimally 
intrusive, overt, and involve “mere questioning.” This part 
argues that while FBI and CBP interviews serve an important 
national-security function, in practice, these interviews raise 
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serious concerns related to their coercion, the content of 
questioning, and the basis for selection of interviewees, and 
that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and internal agency 
guidelines provide insufficient constraints. 
A. FBI and CBP Interviews: Context and Concerns 
Some scholars and officials have estimated that the FBI 
has conducted as many as two hundred thousand or half a 
million interviews of Muslims in the United States20—
staggering numbers, if accurate, given estimates that adult 
Muslims in the United States number fewer than two million.21 
In the first three years following the September 11 attacks, the 
FBI carried out at least four well-publicized national rounds of 
interviews of Muslims and Arabs. These rounds included two 
interview campaigns of thousands of Arab male noncitizens 
based on demographic information suggesting “similarit[ies]” 
with al Qaeda terrorists;22 interviews of nearly ten thousand 
Iraqi immigrants, including U.S. citizens, before the invasion of 
Iraq;23 and interviews of Muslims in the months before the 2004 
presidential election.24 But beyond these announced interview 
campaigns, the FBI continues to interview U.S. Muslims, in 
waves and individually, in order to investigate specific terrorist 
threats,25 gather general intelligence about communities,26 
  
 20 LOUISE A. CAINKAR, HOMELAND INSECURITY: THE ARAB AMERICAN AND 
MUSLIM EXPERIENCE AFTER 9/11 113, 125 (2009) (citing statements in 2005 by a retired 
FBI counterterrorism official and the director of the MIT Center for International 
Studies). It is not clear what data these estimates relied on, and the FBI official’s 
reference to “half a million interviews” may have been intended as a rhetorical 
statement of the large number of interviews rather than an actual estimate.  
 21 A recent national study by the Pew Research Center estimated that there 
are 1.4 million adult Muslims in the United States, although estimates of the 
community’s size vary considerably. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE 
CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 9-10 (2007).  
 22 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-459, HOMELAND SECURITY: 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 
7-8 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS]. 
 23 See, e.g., Tom Brune, Defending Iraqi Interviews, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 18, 
2003, at A28; Frank James, FBI Questions Rankle Some U.S. Iraqis, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 
13, 2003, at C14. 
 24 See, e.g., Brian Haynes, Extra Scrutiny Chafes Muslims, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1A; Richard B. Schmitt & Donna Horowitz, FBI Starts to Question 
Muslims in U.S. About Possible Attacks, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A17; Dennis 
Wagner, FBI’s Queries of Muslims Spurs Anxiety, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 2004, at 1B. 
 25 See, e.g., Jake Armstrong, FBI in Lodi: Abusive or Just Assertive?, LODI 
NEWS-SENTINEL, July 23, 2005 (describing questioning and surveillance of Muslims in 
Lodi, California after arrest of several residents on terrorism and/or immigration 
charges); Nathaniel Hoffman, Muslims Endure FBI Persistence in Lodi, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, June 11, 2005, at A01 (same). 
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follow up on tips of suspicious activity called in from the 
public,27 or solicit people to act as undercover informants.28  
At U.S. international airports and land borders, the 
CBP questions returning travelers, including U.S. citizens, to 
intercept terrorists, weapons, and physical contraband29 as well 
as to collect intelligence for law enforcement agencies’ broader 
use.30 Reports of actual interviews make clear that the 
intelligence collected is not limited to activities with a specific 
nexus to the border (such as a person’s legal status in the 
United States or suspicious international travels), but includes 
information gathering on U.S. mosques and organizations 
within the United States.31 Thus, the agency uses its authority 
to search and question travelers at U.S. borders to acquire a 
range of information that law enforcement could not easily 
compel within the United States. 
All travelers at U.S. borders can expect some scrutiny at 
the point of entry, including a review of identification and travel 
documents, and sometimes immigration-status questioning or 
luggage inspection.32 For most U.S. citizens, these encounters are 
brief, but the CBP pulls aside some individuals—including 
citizens—for protracted questioning or more intrusive searches. 
  
 26 See, e.g., Carrie Johnson & Robin Shulman, Probes Test Trust that 
Authorities Strove to Win from U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2009, at A03 
(quoting retired FBI special agent describing agents’ role as to “know everything that’s 
going on” in a mosque or community); see also Alex Ransom, Muslims Feel Targeted by 
FBI, MERCURY (Dall.), Apr. 11, 2010, at 1. 
 27 See, e.g., Eric Bailey, FBI Questions High School Student over “PLO” 
Doodle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at B4 (describing questioning of 16-year-old based 
on allegation that student had doodled the initials “PLO” on a binder and stored 
pictures of suicide bombers on his cell phone). 
 28 See, e.g., Peter Waldman, A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk 
Losing Visa, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2006, at A1. 
 29 U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Protecting Our Borders—This Is CBP, 
CBP.GOV (June 7, 2010), www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml.  
 30 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049, BORDER 
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf (describing sharing of 
terrorism information with other federal agencies); see also ANALYSIS OF EXCERPTS FROM 
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS—ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 2008 FOIA RELEASE 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/alc/bordersearch_analysis.pdf (describing 
email from CBP New York field office stating that CBP’s data collection capabilities had 
attracted wide interest from other law enforcement agencies); Ellen Nakashima, Expanded 
Powers to Search Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A02 
(describing FBI interview of individual based on information obtained from CBP search). 
 31 See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.  
 32  U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., KNOW BEFORE YOU GO: REGULATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL BY U.S. RESIDENTS 3, 5 (2009), available at http://www.cbp.gov/ 
linkhandler/cgov/travel/vacation/kbyg/kbyg_regulations.ctt/kbyg_regulations.pdf 
[hereinafter KNOW BEFORE YOU GO]. 
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These selections may occur either at “random”33 or as a result of 
factors like travel to particular countries,34 presence on a watch 
list,35 or undisclosed “risk factors” flagged by an automated 
program.36 These selection decisions do not require 
individualized suspicion.37  
Both FBI and CBP interviews serve indisputably 
important purposes. Following the September 11 attacks, the 
FBI shifted its focus from traditional law enforcement to 
intelligence gathering to detect and interrupt potential 
threats.38 With tens of thousands of threats and suspicious 
activities identified each year,39 interviews allow the FBI to 
gather information directly from individuals believed to have 
some information about a possible threat. In many cases, as the 
agency has argued, interviews allow the FBI to quickly rule out 
individuals who do not pose a real threat—preventing further 
scrutiny of innocent people and focusing scarce investigative 
resources on actual concerns.40  
The same need for efficient screening applies at the 
border. The CBP states that nearly 1.2 million travelers attempt 
to cross into the United States each day, and the agency 
intercepts about five hundred people a year out of terrorism or 
national-security concerns.41 According to the agency, border 
screening interviews have enabled it to prevent actual terrorists 
  
 33 U.S. Customs & Border Prot., If You Experience Problems with Your 
Arrival in the U.S., CBP.GOV (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/ 
fact_sheets/travel/usarrivals_problems.xml. 
 34 SHIRIN SINNAR ET AL., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. 
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 31-32 
(2009), available at http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/alc/publications/us-border-report-
returning-home/ [hereinafter ASIAN LAW CAUCUS].  
 35 Id. at 33-35. 
 36 Id. at 28-29; see also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 29. 
 37 See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 38 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC 
FBI OPERATIONS 5-6, 9, 17 (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY GUIDELINES]; Scott Shane & 
Lowell Bergman, FBI Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2006, at A1. 
 39 See AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT 09-02, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST 
THREAT AND SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT TRACKING SYSTEM ii (2008) (reporting 108,000 
threats and suspicious incidents recorded in FBI database between July 2004 and 
November 2007). 
 40 “Are You Part of a Revolution Trying to Overthrow the Government of the 
United States?,” PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Jan. 15, 2003, at 22 (quoting FBI 
explanation that interviewing donors to Muslim charities suspected of links to 
terrorists allows law enforcement to rule out those who innocently gave donations).  
 41 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP: SECURING AMERICA’S BORDERS 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/publications/mission/cbp_ 
securing_borders.ctt/cbp_securing_borders.pdf [hereinafter SECURING AMERICA’S BORDERS]. 
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from entering; for example, based on suspicions raised in an 
interview, it denied entry to a Jordanian national who later 
killed 132 people in a suicide bombing abroad.42 
Despite the clear necessity for FBI and CBP interviews, 
the way in which these interviews are conducted raises three 
concerns. One concern relates to the coercion and intimidation 
interviewees face. Although FBI interviews are nominally 
voluntary, the tactics the FBI used in some interviews reported 
by the press or community organizations virtually compelled 
compliance.43 According to these accounts, FBI agents often 
approached people at work, where they could not refuse to 
cooperate without eliciting suspicion and fear of reprisal from 
employers already wary of Muslims; some individuals 
reportedly lost their jobs after workplace visits.44 FBI agents 
reportedly pressured some individuals to submit to questioning 
immediately, despite their stated desire to obtain a lawyer 
first.45 At other times, agents knocked on people’s doors late in 
the evening or at night, which heightened the interviewees’ 
perception of intimidation.46 In some cases, FBI agents 
misrepresented the purpose of an interview: agents told a 
person that they were investigating potential hate crimes 
against Muslims or conducting general community outreach 
while asking questions that focused on who the person knew 
and whether the interviewee presented a threat.47 And agents 
  
 42 Id. at 4. 
 43 To be sure, this was not true as a universal matter: FBI agents sometimes 
told interviewees that the questioning was voluntary. See, e.g., James, supra note 23. 
In addition, some individuals declined interview requests. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra 
note 25 (reporting that several Muslims refused to appear for interviews). But the only 
quantitative evidence of individuals declining interview requests, from the 
government’s initial post-9/11 interview program, suggests the numbers are miniscule. 
See Memorandum on Final Report on Interview Project from Kenneth L. Wainstein, 
Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 15, 2002) 
[hereinafter Final Report on Interview Project] (reporting that only 1 in 69 individuals 
in Oregon, 1 in 59 in Minnesota, and 8 of 313 in Eastern Michigan declined). 
 44 See, e.g., Barbara Carmen, FBI Agents Stir Old Fears Among Iraqi-
Americans, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 2003, at 01C (quoting Ohio Muslim leader 
stating that some people lost their jobs after FBI workplace visits); Tim Townsend, FBI 
Interviews Prompt Muslim Rights Project, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2010, at 
A1 (noting workplace interviews); ACLU Sues, Says FBI Spying on Muslims, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 3, 2004, at 10 (same); CAINKAR, supra note 20, at 170 (same). 
 45 Josh Richman, ACLU Sues Over Muslim Interviews, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, 
Oct. 23, 2004. 
 46 See, e.g., ACLU Sues, Says FBI Spying on Muslims, supra note 44; “Are 
You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40. 
 47 “Are You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40; COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC 
RELATIONS, GREATER L.A. AREA CHAPTER, THE FBI’S USE OF INFORMANTS, 
RECRUITMENT AND INTIMIDATION WITHIN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 6 (2009) [hereinafter 
CAIR CALIFORNIA] (on file with author). 
2011] QUESTIONING LAW ENFORCEMENT 51 
reportedly told others that if they refused to submit to an 
interview, the agents would arrest them.48 
In an indeterminate number of cases, the FBI engaged 
in even more overt intimidation to compel people to agree to 
ostensibly voluntary interviews. For instance, after the arrests 
of a Lodi, California, father and son on terrorism charges,49 the 
FBI aggressively sought information from other Pakistani 
Muslims: agents stationed their cars in front of homes, followed 
people for days, circled a mosque hosting a “know your rights” 
presentation where individuals they sought to interview had 
gathered, called individuals as many as ten times a day, and 
warned people that they would be “bad mouthed” at work if 
they did not cooperate.50 These measures conveyed a broader 
impression that the FBI would ratchet up pressure on those 
who declined an interview request. 
At U.S. borders, by contrast, the compulsion is explicit: 
individuals cannot enter (or return to) the United States 
without satisfying border agents’ demands. Although U.S. 
citizens have an absolute right to enter the country,51 legally 
preventing the CBP from denying entry altogether to citizens 
who decline to answer questions,52 the CBP sometimes prolongs 
the detention of individuals who refuse to answer questions or 
subjects them to more intense searches as a result.53 Agents 
have not only used their power to delay admission to enforce 
  
 48 Carmen, supra note 44; CAIR CALIFORNIA, supra note 47, at 6. 
 49 Linda Goldston & Lisa Fernandez, FBI Expanding Terror Probe Tied to 
Lodi Father, Son, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 10, 2005, at A1. The government 
initially suggested that others in Lodi, beyond those detained, might be linked to al 
Qaeda, but no other arrests followed. Many observers questioned the initial charges, 
including a retired FBI agent who sought to testify in defense of the accused. Shane & 
Bergman, supra note 38, at A1; Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid 
Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at I16; John Simerman & Jessica Guynn, Arrests 
Illuminate Terror Probe, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A01. 
 50 Armstrong, supra note 25; Hoffman, supra note 25, at A01; Letter from ACLU 
of N. Cal. & Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area to FBI and Other 
Agencies Requesting Information Under Freedom of Information Act 2-3 (June 16, 2005), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/aclu%20-%20nc%20foia%20request%20for% 
20lodi.pdf (describing complaints of Muslim community members related to Lodi terrorism 
investigation). 
 51 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (indicating that U.S. citizenship 
confers an “absolute right to enter [the nation’s] borders”). 
 52 In several cases, the U.S. government is alleged to have prevented U.S. 
citizens on the “no-fly list” from boarding flights returning to the United States, 
sometimes for extended periods, though it eventually permitted them to return. See Peter 
Finn, Detained Va. Teen Set to Return to U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2011, at B01.  
 53 See ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 12 & n.4. 
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cooperation with questioning54 but have also, at times, engaged 
in more overt intimidation.  
For instance, Zakariya Reed—a U.S. citizen, Muslim 
convert, and National Guard veteran—experienced several 
intimidating encounters at the U.S.-Canada border.55 Reed 
perceived one occasion as deliberately intimidating: a border 
agent asked Reed about a letter to the editor that Reed wrote, 
which was critical of U.S. support for Israel and the war in Iraq; 
in the same interview, another agent conspicuously removed and 
reloaded the clip of his gun in front of Reed.56 On a separate 
occasion, five CBP agents stopped and surrounded Reed’s car, 
frisked him, and held him for several hours; during the 
interview, a CBP agent asked Reed why he had adopted a 
Muslim name and converted to Islam.57 Other interviews of U.S. 
Muslims have involved handcuffing or displays of physical force58 
or statements that at “the border, . . . you have no rights.”59 
Protracted questioning at the border has often taken 
place in conjunction with detailed searches of travelers’ 
electronic media and reading materials. CBP officers conducted 
detailed searches of Muslims’ laptop computers, cell phones, 
and other electronic media,60 asking the travelers to identify 
family members appearing in pictures stored on a digital 
camera,61 questioning them about websites they visited,62 or 
examining websites individuals flagged as “favorites.”63 Border 
agents perused travelers’ books, lecture notes, and personal 
  
 54 See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating 
that U.S. citizens were threatened with continued detention unless they cooperated 
with CBP inspections); MUSLIM ADVOCATES, UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS: 
INVESTIGATING THE POLITICS, FAITH, & FINANCES OF AMERICANS RETURNING HOME 21-
22 (2009) [hereinafter MUSLIM ADVOCATES] (reporting that CBP told U.S. citizen 
reluctant to answer questions that the detention would end sooner if he complied). 
 55 Matthew Rothschild, Muslim American Grilled at Border over Religion, 
PROGRESSIVE (May 9, 2007), http://www.progressive.org/mag_mc050907. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 28. 
 58 See, e.g., MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 22, 28, 29; ASIAN LAW 
CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 36; Press Release, Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, DHS to 
Probe CAIR-MI Complaints on Border Questioning of Muslims (May 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.cairmichigan.org/news/press_releases/cair_mi_welcomes_dhs_civil_rights_inv
estigation_/. 
 59 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 11. 
 60 Janet I. Tu, Privacy vs. Border Security: Critics Say Laptop Searches Cross 
the Line, SEATTLE TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A1.  
 61 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 16. 
 62 Id. at 19. 
 63 Id. at 34. 
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papers, and sometimes photocopied the documents or asked 
questions about the travelers’ views on the material.64  
Beyond the coercion involved in FBI and CBP interviews, 
a second concern relates to the content of the questions asked. 
FBI and CBP officers questioned numerous Muslims, including 
U.S. citizens, about their religious and political beliefs and 
activities—subjects that U.S. citizens do not ordinarily expect 
government officers to probe. For example, CBP agents spent 
three hours questioning one Ph.D. student returning to the 
United States from a U.S. government-sponsored trip to Yemen 
on his local mosques, how long he had been Muslim, and the 
Islamic organizations in which he participated; when the 
student questioned the relevance of the religious inquiries, the 
agents told him that the detention “would end sooner if he 
simply answered the questions.”65 CBP agents asked other 
returning U.S. citizens about their views on foreign policies and 
politics,66 the mosques they attended,67 their charitable 
activities,68 membership in religious organizations,69 attendance 
at community events,70 participation in political 
demonstrations,71 support for lawful organizations,72 the religious 
sect to which they belonged,73 and prayer habits.74 Similar 
questions were asked in FBI interviews.75 
Such questioning, even without coercion or intimidation, 
can convey powerful messages about the government’s respect 
for communities, neutrality towards religions, and overall 
  
 64 See, e.g., id. at 16-18, 21; Ellen Nakashima, Expanded Powers to Search 
Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A02; Ellen Nakashima, 
Collecting of Details on Travelers Documented, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2007, at A01. 
 65 MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 21-22.  
 66 Id. at 33, 40; ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 34; Jack Chang, Men Say 
Customs Bureau Asked About Faith, Politics, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 29, 2003, at A01. 
 67 MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 20, 36, 38. 
 68 Id. at 20. 
 69 Id. at 22. 
 70 Id. at 30. 
 71 Id. at 39. 
 72 Id. at 30. 
 73 Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, Muslims Resent Customs Queries: Group Collects 
Complaints on Faith Questions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 29, 2003, at 1B. 
 74 MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 34. 
 75 See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez & Henry Pierson Curtis, FBI Plans Interviews with 
Arab Americans, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; Wayne Parry, Muslims Offered 
Free Legal Help for Voluntary FBI Interviews, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 12, 2004, at B05; 
Richard B. Schmitt & Donna Horowitz, FBI Starts to Question Muslims in U.S. About 
Possible Attacks, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A17; NICOLE J. HENDERSON ET AL., VERA 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT & ARAB AMERICAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: TECHNICAL REPORT 84 (2006) [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE 
STUDY]; “Are You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40; James, supra note 23. 
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fairness. Unlike covert investigative methods such as electronic 
surveillance, an interview is a highly personal encounter between 
an individual and a law enforcement officer who embodies the full 
force of the law—the power to arrest and imprison, to detain and 
deport, or to exclude altogether from the country. In that 
encounter, even a relatively low-level officer represents the 
authority of the United States. Thus, the exchange that occurs in 
an interview signals the U.S. government’s beliefs as to what, or 
whom, it considers threatening.  
When an FBI agent asks an Iraqi-American, selected 
without individualized suspicion, whether he practices Islam—
following questions on knowledge of terrorism or weapons of 
mass destruction—it sends the message that the government 
considers the practice of Islam itself to be a threat.76 Similarly, 
when a CBP agent asks a U.S. resident at the border his views 
on the war in Iraq,77 it signals that the government considers 
one’s position on U.S. foreign policy relevant to his belonging in 
the United States. As a uniquely expressive investigative 
method, interviews carry a particular risk of conveying 
messages, intended or not. 
A third concern relates to the basis for interviewee 
selection—specifically, the concern that either ethnic or 
religious profiling, or First Amendment activities, led to that 
selection. While some FBI and CBP interviews are occasioned 
by specific threat information or the inclusion of a person on a 
watch list,78 ethnic criteria or First Amendment activities 
supply the explicit basis for other interviews. For instance, the 
FBI openly relied on national origin in interviewing thousands 
of U.S. Arabs in the months after the September 11 attacks79 
and in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq; the latter 
interview campaign included U.S. citizens.80 At other times, an 
ethnic basis for interview selection was unannounced but 
strongly indicated by the demographics of those interviewed.81 
  
 76 See James, supra note 23. 
 77 MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 41. 
 78 In fact, inclusion in the Customs and Border Protection watch list raises 
separate concerns related to the inadequate review process for watch list additions and 
the insufficient mechanisms for redress. See ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 33-40. 
 79 The government selected interviewees because of demographic and visa 
similarities to al Qaeda terrorists. See GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS, supra note 
22, at 7-8. 
 80 See, e.g., Brune, supra note 23; James, supra note 20. 
 81 See, e.g., Phillip O’Connor, Tactics with Somali Cabdrivers Stir Criticism of 
FBI, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2011, at A1 (describing interviews of twenty-
five to fifty Somali cabdrivers after the arrest of one for material support to terrorism). 
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On other occasions still, the FBI’s focus on particular groups 
resulted from its response to suspicious activity reports called 
in by the public, even where the reports clearly suggested 
ethnic or religious biases.82 
The CBP has also based targeting decisions explicitly on 
national origin, even for U.S. citizens. For instance, past CBP 
intelligence directives have called for particular scrutiny of 
naturalized U.S. citizens of Pakistani origin.83 In addition, CBP 
officers told some travelers that despite their U.S. citizenship, 
they were targeted because of where they were born;84 officers 
told others that even if they acquired U.S. citizenship, they 
would “always be a foreigner.”85 
Finally, for both FBI and CBP interviews, individuals’ 
First Amendment activities sometimes triggered the selection 
decision. Part II of this article elaborates on interviews based on 
First Amendment profiling, the harm such interviews present, 
and the line separating justifiable from unwarranted scrutiny. 
Ultimately, the coercion, content, and selection criteria 
of interviews affect not just the rights and liberties of the 
Muslim community, but also potentially the very interest in 
security that is the professed goal of the interviews themselves. 
A growing body of literature suggests that for U.S. Muslims, as 
with other communities, perceptions of the fairness of law 
enforcement practices affect community members’ trust in, and 
willingness to assist, law enforcement.86 For instance, a recent 
study of New York Muslims by Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, 
and Aziz Huq found that perceptions of “procedural justice” 
involving U.S. counterterrorism policies—but not self-described 
religiosity, cultural differences, or political background—
strongly correlate with individuals’ willingness to cooperate 
  
 82 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON 
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 
ATTACKS 15-16 (2003) (reporting post-9/11 detentions of individuals based on 
“anonymous tips called in by members of the public suspicious of Arab and Muslim 
neighbors who kept odd schedules”). 
 83 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 29-31 (noting 2004 intelligence 
directive that called for greater scrutiny of naturalized citizens of Pakistani origin); see 
also Anne E. Kornblut & Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Changing Way Air Travelers Screened, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010, at A06. 
 84 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 25 (reporting interview in which 
CBP pulled aside a U.S. citizen because she was born in Pakistan). 
 85 Id. at 24.  
 86 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 132-41; VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra 
note 75, at 87, 94-95. 
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with antiterrorism policing.87 As a visible and overt practice 
affecting U.S. Muslims, FBI and CBP interviews perceived as 
unfair may impose broader systemic costs in addition to 
burdening individual rights. 
B. Interviews and Fourth Amendment Fictions 
The natural place to begin an examination of the 
constitutionality of interviews might be the Fourth 
Amendment—the usual standard for measuring the lawfulness 
of law enforcement detentions. Two legal fictions, however, 
presumptively exclude interviews from Fourth Amendment 
protection. First, because individuals are not required to 
submit to an FBI interview, courts deem these interviews 
“voluntary.” Second, because border officials may question any 
traveler who seeks to enter the United States, courts consider 
CBP interviews “routine.”  
As Tracey Maclin has argued in reference to the Justice 
Department’s initial post-9/11 interview campaign, most FBI 
interviews would not constitute seizures under the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, despite the 
fact that those approached would have difficulty refusing the 
interview request.88 The Supreme Court has indicated that 
police questioning generally falls outside the scope of Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny because individuals in such encounters 
are free to terminate the questioning.89 Under current legal 
norms, only in the extraordinary case where police engage in 
“patently abusive and intimidating behavior” would a court 
find that an interview constitutes a seizure.90 According to 
Maclin, empirical evidence suggests that most people would not 
feel free to terminate ostensibly consensual police encounters 
because the average person interprets even a law enforcement 
officer’s polite request for cooperation as a legal command.91 
Nonetheless, the constitutional standard for “voluntary” 
  
 87 Tom Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism 
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 368-69 (2010). 
 88 Maclin, supra note 18, at 493-502. 
 89 Id. at 494; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-20 (1999) (describing Supreme Court’s 
“reasonable person fiction” that an ordinary person would be able to reject police 
questioning). 
 90 Maclin, supra note 18, at 500-01.  
 91 Id. at 507. 
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questioning “was never intended to measure the reality of 
police-citizen encounters.”92  
In the CBP context, the separate fiction that 
questioning is “routine” scuttles ordinary Fourth Amendment 
protections. The Supreme Court has long proclaimed the 
government’s “paramount” authority to police the entry of 
people and objects across its borders93 and has declared that 
border searches are reasonable simply because they occur at 
the border.94 Thus, the Court has determined that the Fourth 
Amendment imposes no requirement of individualized 
suspicion for brief questioning on one’s immigration status at 
border checkpoints95 or for “routine” searches and seizures.96 
Applying this restrictive Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
two federal courts deemed the border detentions of Muslim 
U.S. citizens returning from abroad routine, despite the fact 
that the detentions were substantially longer, more intrusive, 
and more stigmatizing than ordinary CBP inspections of 
returning U.S. citizens. Thus, in Tabbaa v. Chertoff, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the questioning, pat-
down searches, fingerprinting, photographing, and four- to six-
hour detentions of Muslim U.S. citizens returning from 
Canada—without individualized suspicion—were “routine” 
even though CBP used screening measures “normally reserved 
for suspected terrorists.”97 The district court in Rahman v. 
Chertoff, a case involving U.S. citizens screened at the border 
because of mistaken association with a terrorist watch list, 
dismissed most of the challenged detentions as “routine” border 
stops, even where the stops included detentions of as long as 
six hours, handcuffing, or brief displays of physical force.98 
Thus, Fourth Amendment doctrine presumptively 
permits FBI and CBP interviews, even those that would not 
strike the average person as truly “voluntary” or “routine.” 
  
 92 Id. 
 93 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004). 
 94 Id. 
 95 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). 
 96 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). 
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C. Weak Internal Constraints on Interviews 
Despite the documented historical use of interviews to 
suppress political activities, and current concerns over the 
practice, FBI and CBP internal guidelines impose few 
constraints on these interviews. In particular, existing 
guidelines do not limit the circumstances in which investigators 
can ask questions related to political and religious activities and 
do not provide effective constraints against selecting people for 
scrutiny on account of their First Amendment activities. 
1. FBI Interviews 
Guidelines for FBI investigations have grown 
progressively less stringent over time and now give FBI officers 
considerable discretion. The attorney general first issued 
internal guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations in 
1976 in response to public outcry over abuses.99 The first 
guidelines required a factual predicate for all investigations 
and additional procedural requirements for interviews, 
including, in most cases, a requirement for supervisory 
approval.100 But successive versions of the attorney general’s 
guidelines loosened such constraints, culminating in the 
newest and weakest version issued by Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey in late 2008.101 
The Mukasey Guidelines include the most expansive 
definition yet of what FBI agents may legitimately investigate, 
permitting agents to conduct a form of investigation called 
“assessments” without any information or even allegation of a 
potential national-security threat.102 The Mukasey Guidelines 
  
 99 See generally Allison Jones, Note, The 2008 FBI Guidelines: Contradiction 
of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137 (2009). 
 100 OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION 
GUIDELINES, reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 20-22 (1978). Under these 1976 “Levi” Guidelines, agents could 
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only to gather certain public information or to identify the subject of an investigation; 
in limited investigations, the next tier, agents could use interviews for other purposes, 
but only with supervisory approval and after “full consideration of such factors as the 
seriousness of the allegation, the need for the interview, and the consequences of using 
the technique.” Id. at 20-21. 
 101 See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38; see also Jones, supra note 99, at 
139-50. 
 102 MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 17, 21; FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 39 (2008), 
available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-i 
[hereinafter OPERATIONS GUIDE]. 
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authorize interviews in assessments as well as other methods “of 
relatively low intrusiveness,”103 and generally do not require 
supervisory approval for interviews.104 The Domestic 
Investigations and Operations Guide implementing the Mukasey 
Guidelines permits pretextual interviews, in which an agent fails 
to reveal an FBI affiliation or the true purpose of the information 
request.105 The Mukasey Guidelines do not permit information 
collection for the purpose of monitoring First Amendment–
protected activity,106 and the Operations Guide states that 
assessments may not be based “solely” on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.107 That standard, however, appears to permit 
an assessment conducted mostly based on First Amendment 
activity but also based on some additional, facially innocent 
fact—say, an agent’s decision to interview those who recently 
converted to Islam and serve in the U.S. armed forces.108 
Beyond the use of interviews for assessments and 
investigations, the Mukasey Guidelines appear to give the FBI 
broad authorization to conduct interviews for intelligence 
planning that goes beyond the investigation of specific cases.109 
They seem to allow interviews that “develop overviews and 
analyses” of “present, emergent, and potential threats and 
vulnerabilities” and “their contexts and causes”110—a standard 
that could conceivably justify interviews initiated to inquire 
into the religious or political “contexts and causes” of extremist 
threats. Notably, while guidelines for the original post-9/11 
interviews of Arab noncitizens forbade inquiries into religious 
  
 103 MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 17-18, 20. 
 104 Id. at 18; OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 63-64. 
 105 OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 64, 68. The FBI plans to release a 
new version of the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide that would grant 
still greater investigative powers to law enforcement agents. See Charlie Savage, F.B.I. 
Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html. 
 106 MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 13. For more detailed FBI 
interpretation of First Amendment restrictions on its activities, see OPERATIONS 
GUIDE, supra note 102, at 24-30.  
 107 OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 44. 
 108 Moreover, the Guide makes clear that its definition of “First Amendment 
activities” does not extend to all activities that would be protected by the First 
Amendment, such as the advocacy of violence. Id. 
 109 See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 29 (permitting FBI to “draw 
on all lawful sources of information” in intelligence analysis). 
 110  Id.  
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beliefs or practices,111 the Mukasey Guidelines and Operations 
Guide do not.112 
The Mukasey Guidelines and Operations Guide include 
some restrictions to prevent coercing interviewees, although the 
press accounts described above suggest that the FBI does not 
consistently follow them. The Operations Guide states that 
information in interviews “must be voluntarily provided” and 
that agents should not “state or imply in any way” that “adverse 
consequences may follow if the interviewee does not provide the 
information.”113 In addition, the Mukasey Guidelines state that 
agents should stop questioning “immediately” if a person 
indicates a desire to consult a lawyer.114 Despite these 
limitations, the Operations Guide does not prohibit FBI agents 
from disregarding ambiguous or hesitant expressions of desire 
for legal counsel, even though individuals approached by the 
FBI may be too intimidated to state that desire definitively. Nor 
does the Guide disallow pressure tactics short of implying 
adverse consequences, such as insinuating that a reluctant 
interviewee “must have something to hide.” 
The Mukasey Guidelines also advise that where 
different investigative methods are each “operationally sound 
and effective,” agents should use the “least intrusive method 
feasible,”115 but the Mukasey Guidelines contain other language 
to minimize the constraint this principle suggests. The 
Operations Guide recognizes that interviews with “employers, 
neighbors, and associates,” or those conducted at the 
workplace, are more intrusive than interviews in discrete 
locations.116 Despite this helpful distinction, the Operations 
Guide also advises that agents should primarily measure the 
degree of intrusion based on how much procedural protection 
established law and the Mukasey Guidelines themselves 
provide for the investigative method117—thus designating 
interviews as a whole as a relatively nonintrusive choice. In 
addition, the Mukasey Guidelines give significant discretion to 
  
 111 GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS, supra note 22, at 9. 
 112 Although the publicly released version of the Operations Guide is redacted, 
one does not expect that the government would redact a restriction that protects 
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 113 OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 63. 
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 117 Id. at 35. 
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agents in interpreting these rules, advising agents not to 
hesitate to use any lawful method, especially in terrorism 
investigations.118 
2. CBP Interviews 
Documents released by the CBP suggest a lack of 
significant constraints on questioning, but the agency has not 
publicly released sufficient information on its border inspection 
policies to fully judge the level of constraint that agents have in 
choosing whom to interview, for how long, or in what manner. A 
CBP training manual states that “routine questioning” at the 
border does not require reasonable suspicion.119 An immigration 
inspection manual released by the department, possibly outdated, 
states that “reasonable suspicion” is generally required to detain 
U.S. citizens for “extensive questioning,” but it appears to vitiate 
that requirement in the next breath by permitting agents to 
“continue inspecting for Customs purposes.”120 
The CBP appears to have no written policy restricting 
the questioning of individuals about religious views, political 
activities, or other expression protected by the First 
Amendment.121 In fact, one high-level CBP official told 
community organizations that it was appropriate to question 
an individual about the mosque the individual attends.122 The 
agency does issue internal directives that may reflect First 
Amendment considerations; for instance, one CBP field office 
advised border agents not to apply special enforcement 
measures based “solely” on a person’s return “from a 
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 119 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL ch. 18.6, at 
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pilgrimage to Mecca,” while also advising that “the large influx 
of travelers during this time period may be used as a cover by 
extremists and/or terrorists to enter the United States.”123  
Thus, existing evidence of internal agency regulations 
suggests insignificant constraints on the factual basis for 
initiating interviews in either the FBI or CBP context, and few 
meaningful constraints on interviews that bear on individuals’ 
political or religious expression. Neither the Fourth Amendment 
nor internal regulations offers real protection against the actual 
intrusion and stigma of FBI and CBP encounters.  
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROFILING 
In the last part, this article argued that the coercion, 
content, and selection criteria behind law enforcement 
interviews present serious concerns that have largely been 
unaddressed. This article turns now to one set of interviews that 
raises particular concern: where individuals’ lawful acts of 
expression or association trigger a knock on the door or 
detention at the border, it sends a particularly strong message of 
exclusion to individuals and their communities and creates a 
chilling effect on expression. This part defines First Amendment 
profiling and discusses the profound stigmatic costs and chilling 
effects of the practice. This article then argues that while First 
Amendment profiling is sometimes justifiable, it is inappropriate 
both where the government deliberately seeks to suppress 
speech and where law enforcement investigations—even those 
with a legitimate purpose—sweep too broadly and consequently 
burden lawful speech and association. 
When the FBI or CBP agent questions a person because 
he wrote a letter to the editor criticizing U.S. intervention in 
Afghanistan, worshipped at a particular mosque, or visited a 
religious website, they engage in what I call First Amendment 
profiling: the selection of a person for law enforcement 
attention because she has engaged in acts of expression or 
association of a political, religious, or cultural nature that 
would be protected by the First Amendment. CBP’s 
investigation of individuals returning to the United States 
  
 123 Memorandum from U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Port of Buffalo, Muslims 
Performing Hajj (Pilgrims to Mecca) (Dec. 12, 2007), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/alc/073008_cbp_bordersearch01.pdf (FOIA document 
released in redacted form to Asian Law Caucus and Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
July 30, 2008, Bates Stamp 191). 
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after attending an Islamic religious conference in Canada, 
litigated in the Second Circuit in Tabbaa v. Chertoff,124 provides 
a paradigmatic example of such profiling. 
Murad Hussain described the detentions in Tabbaa as 
“cultural profiling,” which he defined as government targeting of 
“expressions of cultural identity” as proxies for “criminality, 
terrorist connections, or other subversive propensities,” noting 
that expressions of identity are often “significantly correlated” 
with membership in a racial, ethnic, or religious group.125 Others 
have called investigations based on First Amendment conduct 
“political profiling”126 or “First Amendment investigations.”127 
Building on these conceptions, I consider First Amendment 
profiling to include investigative decisions triggered by 
expression or association of a cultural, religious, or political 
nature, whether “pure” speech or expressive conduct, that would 
be protected under the First Amendment. 
Given that the First Amendment protects such a wide 
range of expression, with no consensus on the amendment’s 
core meaning, scholars have recognized the difficulty in 
delimiting the scope of expression that raises First Amendment 
concerns in the investigative context. Eugene Volokh argues 
that a broad interpretation of the First Amendment might lead 
one to the untenable conclusion that because speaking or 
sending an e-mail are constitutionally protected actions, we 
should interpret the First Amendment as limiting government 
“subpoenas demanding that people testify about what someone 
said or wrote.”128 My definition focuses on expression or 
association of a religious, cultural, or political nature, not as a 
normative statement of the outer limits of First Amendment 
protection, but because expression or association outside these 
areas frequently raises concerns of a different kind, and 
arguably degree. A person who triggers FBI scrutiny by 
sending an e-mail about purchasing a vast quantity of fertilizer 
may have engaged in a communicative act protected by the 
First Amendment (sending an e-mail), but the act holds no 
particular political, cultural, or religious meaning. A law 
enforcement investigation into that speech act does not 
  
 124 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
 125 Hussain, supra note 16, at 925-26. 
 126 Fisher, supra note 16, at 625 (citing Chip Berlet & Abby Scher, Political 
Profiling: Police Spy on Peaceful Activities, AMNESTY NOW 20 (Spring 2003)). 
 127 See generally Rosenthal, supra note 16. 
 128 Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is It 
Proper?, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1444 (2005); see also Solove, supra note 16, at 153. 
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stigmatize particular views or manifestations of identity in the 
same way as investigations triggered by the political, cultural, 
or religious aspect of a communication. 
While I limit my definition of First Amendment 
profiling to expression and association of a political, cultural, or 
religious nature, I expand it in two other respects. First, I 
consider First Amendment profiling to include not just an 
initial decision to target a person for investigation, but also any 
subsequent decision to prolong an investigation on account of 
First Amendment expression. For example, First Amendment 
profiling would include a law enforcement agent’s decision to 
broaden an investigation because of a person’s responses to 
questions about religious affiliations. It would not include, 
however, incidental questioning on religious or political beliefs, 
even if independently objectionable, where it does not trigger 
the interview or intensify law enforcement scrutiny.129 
Second, I include within First Amendment profiling 
investigative decisions based “predominantly”—not just 
“solely”—on protected expression. For instance, it would 
include not just border agents’ decisions, as in Tabbaa, to 
question people solely because they attended an Islamic 
conference, but also a decision to question people because they 
had attended the conference and returned at night, or because 
they had attended the conference and were young men. The 
concerns raised by First Amendment profiling, as described in 
the next section, are not diminished in such cases. 
A. The Impact of First Amendment Profiling 
1. Stigmatic Harms 
The most immediate, and perhaps most pervasive, harm 
of First Amendment profiling in law enforcement 
investigations, including interviews, is the imposition of 
stigma.130 U.S. Muslims have described interviews triggered by 
  
 129 Inquiries on religion and politics, even without First Amendment profiling, 
might give rise to an independent challenge based on the Supreme Court’s compelled 
disclosure cases, especially in compulsory border interviews. For some discussion of 
these cases, see infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text. 
 130 A large volume of literature, since the publication of Erving Goffman’s 
seminal account, has attempted to define and conceptualize stigma. ERVING GOFFMAN, 
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). I use the term 
“stigma” in both the sense defined by Goffman (an “attribute that is deeply 
discrediting” that reduces the individual “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, 
discounted one”) and according to Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s more recent 
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their religious or political activities as branding them, and 
their communities, as disloyal or suspicious—as outsiders 
excluded from “belonging” to the nation. 
“We weren’t treated as American citizens. We were 
treated as suspects,” recounted one Muslim college student 
whom CBP detained for attending the conference referenced in 
Tabbaa and then ordered to “stand face-first against the wall,” 
his legs apart, to be searched for weapons.131 Such encounters 
affect not just the individuals questioned, but their broader 
ethnic or religious community’s sense of belonging in the 
United States. An Oregon Muslim community leader 
questioned by CBP agents about why he made a religious 
pilgrimage to Mecca said that Muslims had grown accustomed 
to being “pariahs in their own country.”132 
The harms associated with First Amendment profiling 
mirror those arising from explicit racial or religious profiling.133 
Where a form of expression is strongly linked to one’s ethnicity, 
national origin, or religion, government selection of individuals for 
special scrutiny on account of their expression will “feel” the same 
as targeting members of that racial or religious group directly. 
Certainly the Muslim Americans detained in Tabbaa did not 
perceive their detentions to be less stigmatizing because the 
trigger was membership at an Islamic conference—not their 
religion per se—or because CBP might theoretically have stopped 
any non-Muslims who said they had attended the conference. As 
the correlation between an expressive practice and membership 
in a particular racial or religious group approaches 100 percent, 
the technical distinction between the two collapses altogether: the 
questioning of seven Muslim men for praying in a convenience 
  
conceptualization of stigma as the co-occurrence of components including: the labeling 
of a particular human difference, the linkage of that difference with stereotypes, the 
use of that difference to separate “us” from “them,” and the resulting loss of status and 
discrimination in a context of unequal power. See id. at 3; Bruce G. Link & Jo. C. 
Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 367 (2001). 
 131 Jay Tokasz, Local Muslims Troubled by Treatment at Border: About 40 
Detained After Toronto Trip, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 31, 2005, at B1. 
 132 Noelle Crombie, FBI Outreach to Muslims Comes Amid Interviews, 
OREGONIAN, July 22, 2004, at C01. 
 133 One might question why an Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clause 
challenge is not available to challenge these measures. See Hussain, supra note 16, at 
944-52 (arguing that where the government selects people for scrutiny based not on 
their membership in a protected group, but based on behavior that largely correlates 
with it, the requirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent will impede 
challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and under prevailing Free Exercise 
Clause interpretations).  
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store parking lot illustrates an instance that is at once religious 
and First Amendment profiling.134 
At the border, questioning and extensive searches of 
returning U.S. citizens particularly convey a message of 
exclusion since CBP agents effectively control the terms by 
which a person can return home. A Sacramento Muslim and 
naturalized citizen recounted that his experiences at the 
border—including repeated screenings, questioning on his 
political views, and searches of websites he visited—made him 
feel “unwelcome” in his own country.135 He said, “I never 
experienced such a feeling at any international airport in the 
world, including Third World countries. But I have this feeling 
when I come home.”136 
Furthermore, First Amendment profiling sends a 
message to the nation as a whole, not just affected 
communities, that Muslims are unequal. As Murad Hussain 
has argued, law enforcement scrutiny of Muslim Americans’ 
expressive activities labels Muslims “presumptively disloyal 
and unworthy of empathy” to the polity at large, facilitating 
hate crimes and private discrimination and stymieing the 
community’s efforts to use civic engagement to achieve social 
equality.137 Indeed, a growing social science and legal literature 
points to the tangible costs of stigma for individuals and 
communities.138 Not only do stigmatized groups lose self-respect 
and tend to internalize “at least part of the version of their 
identities imposed by the stigma,” but society correspondingly 
“acts toward the stigmatized person on the basis of the stigma,” 
leading to a deprivation of material goods from economic 
opportunities to political representation.139 While stigma is 
  
 134 See Ken Ritter, Muslim Group Says FBI Still on Nevada Prayer Case, 
KOLOTV.COM (June 21, 2010), http://www.kolotv.com/southernnevadanews/headlines/ 
96852029.html. When one man questioned why their prayers had elicited suspicion, 
the police officer replied, “I don’t know if you’re . . . saying, ‘I hope that I kill a police 
officer today.’ . . . We just want to make sure that you guys are good people.” CAIRtv, 
Video: CAIR Concerned About FBI Questioning of “Henderson 7,” YOUTUBE (June 23, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxGNN3U6Dac&feature=player_embedded.  
 135 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 34. 
 136 Id.; see also Kuruvila, supra note 73 (quoting U.S. citizen describing his 
experience of CBP questioning as “trying to instill in us a feeling that we don’t belong here”). 
 137 Hussain, supra note 16, at 938-41. 
 138 See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in 
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 836-47 (2004); Link & Phelan, supra note 130, at 370-74. 
 139 KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1989). For recent studies suggesting links between stigma and 
the physical health of U.S. Arab communities, see Diane S. Lauderdale, Birth 
Outcomes for Arabic-Named Women in California Before and After September 11, 43 
DEMOGRAPHY 185 (2006); Aasim I. Padela & Michele Heisler, The Association of 
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often seen as a result of equal protection violations, it results 
no less from First Amendment profiling. 
2. Chilling Effects on Expression 
Perhaps the most common harm legal scholars posit as 
resulting from law enforcement investigations into political and 
religious expression is the chilling impact on such expression.140 
Despite the fact that scholars sometimes favorably contrast 
interviews to clandestine surveillance,141 the overt nature of 
interviews actually makes them more likely to directly and 
immediately influence behavior than covert investigative 
methods. 
On some occasions, the chilling effect may be deliberate. 
Law enforcement agencies deliberately used interviews in the 
past to suppress lawful political activities by sowing mistrust 
within movements. The extensive congressional investigation of 
U.S. intelligence operations in the mid-1970s concluded that the 
FBI’s fifteen-year Cointelpro programs, aimed at civil rights 
activists and others on the Left, deliberately used interviews to 
disrupt political activities.142 An infamous FBI memorandum 
from 1970 advised that interviews could “enhance the paranoia 
in these circles” and convey the impression that “there is an FBI 
agent behind every mailbox.”143 
Even where law enforcement agencies do not 
deliberately use interviews to suppress expression, they 
acknowledge using them to send a message that government 
agents are watching. The Department of Justice explained its 
post-9/11 interviews of several thousand Arab immigrants as 
an attempt to “sow disruption among potential terrorists,” and 
claimed that the interviews “ensured that potential terrorists 
sheltering themselves within our communities were aware that 
  
Perceived Abuse and Discrimination After September 11, 2001, with Psychological 
Distress, Level of Happiness, and Health Status Among Arab Americans, 100 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 284 (2010).  
 140 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 165; Horn, supra note 16, at 750-51; 
Fisher, supra note 16, at 646-53; Hussain, supra note 16, at 934-38; Lininger, supra 
note 16, at 1233-37. 
 141 Fisher, supra note 16, at 673. 
 142 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, FINAL REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED 
STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. DOC. 
NO. 94-755, at 44 (2d Sess. 1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 143 Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (quoting FBI memo and describing harassing FBI interviews targeting Socialist 
Workers Party). 
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law enforcement was on the job in their neighborhoods.”144 The 
FBI has also explained other interview programs—including 
interviews of potential anarchist protestors before the 2004 
national political conventions145 and surveillance of Muslims 
before that year’s presidential election146—as efforts to deter 
acts of violence through obvious surveillance. While using an 
investigative technique to dissuade people from committing 
violence is not problematic in principle,147 it is unclear that 
targets of such practices can distinguish that permissible 
message from others potentially received (e.g., “do not protest” 
or “do not go to the mosque”). 
Thus, when FBI agents interviewed sixty Muslims in 
Flint, Michigan, regarding their donations to Muslim American 
charities, many donors interpreted the investigation as 
intimidation aimed at chilling contributions to Muslim 
charities.148 FBI agents visited a number of donors two years in a 
row, both times on the “eve of Ramadan,” the Muslim holy 
month in which many individuals choose to give religiously 
ordained charitable contributions.149 During these visits, two 
agents interviewed the donors at their workplaces, while two 
others simultaneously interviewed their spouses at home.150 The 
inquiries, and particularly the return visits, convinced the 
donors that the government sought to intimidate them into not 
supporting lawful Muslim charities, with the implied message 
that “[i]f you keep giving, we’ll keep coming back at you.”151 
Whether or not the government intended that message, the fact 
that law enforcement agencies continue to acknowledge using 
  
 144 Final Report on Interview Project, supra note 43, at 1, 7. 
 145 OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING 
POTENTIAL PROTESTORS AT THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL 
POLITICAL CONVENTIONS 31-34 (2006) [hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROTESTORS]. 
 146 CBS News: FBI’s Anti-Terror “October Plan” (CBS television broadcast Sept. 
17, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/17/eveningnews/ 
main644096.shtml (reporting “aggressive” and “obvious” surveillance of alleged terrorist 
sympathizers and revisiting of mosques to question people about suspicious behavior). 
 147 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling 
the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 690 (1978) (distinguishing “benign” 
deterrence resulting from “intentional regulation of speech or other activity properly 
subject to governmental control” from “invidious” chilling of activities protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 148 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY: 
CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE “WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING” 69-73 
(2009) [hereinafter BLOCKING FAITH]. 
 149 Id. at 70. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 71. 
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interviews to send a message underscores the point that 
interviews can serve as an intervention, not just an information-
gathering measure. 
Indeed, there is powerful anecdotal evidence along with 
additional support from ethnographic and empirical studies of 
chilling effects on expression in the Muslim community. These 
accounts indicate that government investigative practices, 
including questioning, have led some U.S. Muslims to avoid 
attending political demonstrations or gatherings,152 refrain from 
donating to political causes or religious charities,153 avoid 
speaking out against U.S. foreign policies or express political 
opinions,154 hesitate to join or participate in mosques or 
community organizations,155 remove their names from group 
membership lists,156 modify their use of the Internet,157 stop 
purchasing political books abroad,158 refuse to speak publicly 
about law enforcement practices,159 and avoid names or clothing 
that express their religious or cultural identities.160 For 
instance, a Muslim community leader asserted that the FBI 
questioned nearly every donor to one Southern California 
mosque, leading to a pronounced decline in donations.161 
  
 152 VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66; JUNE HAN, “WE ARE 
AMERICANS TOO”: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON SOUTH ASIAN 
COMMUNITIES 14 (2006).  
 153 An extensive ACLU report documented FBI and CBP interviews of donors 
to Muslim charities and presented statements of numerous community members who 
had stopped giving money in response to questioning of themselves, friends, or family. 
BLOCKING FAITH, supra note 148, at 97-100; see also HAN, supra note 152, at 14; VERA 
INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66.  
 154 Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, Muslims Say FBI Spying Is Causing 
Anxiety: Use of an Informant in Orange County Leads Some to Shun Mosques, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at 1; VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 58; Matthew 
Rothschild, FBI Talks to Muslim High School Student About “PLO” Initials on His 
Binder, PROGRESSIVE (Dec. 23, 2005), http://www.progressive.org/mag_mc122305 
(reporting that high school student became hesitant to express his political views after 
FBI interview apparently triggered by his writing the initials “PLO” on a binder). 
 155 Tyler et al., supra note 87, at 396; Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 154. 
 156 VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66 (reporting statement of 
community organization that membership declined because people called to remove 
names from database). 
 157 Sidhu, supra note 16, at 391. 
 158 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 18, 19 (citing examples of 
individuals subject to repeated lengthy CBP interviews and searches who no longer 
purchase books abroad). 
 159 Carmen, supra note 44. 
 160 Tyler et al., supra note 87, at 396; Brian Haynes, Extra Scrutiny Chafes 
Muslims, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1A (describing the decision of one Muslim 
convert, who was followed in an airport while reading the Quran, not to adopt a 
Muslim name for fear of harassment). 
 161 Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 154. 
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These claims are largely anecdotal, and one might 
question the extent to which individuals and communities have 
actually ceased to engage in expression or association. Some 
individuals subjected to First Amendment profiling say they 
would continue the activities that triggered the scrutiny.162 In 
fact, ethnographic studies show that while post-9/11 scrutiny of 
Muslims led some people to withdraw from activities that 
would identify them as Muslim, Arab, or South Asian, others 
became more engaged in civic and political life in an effort to 
dispel stereotypes and resist unfair treatment.163 Communities 
are not monolithic; they can simultaneously exhibit chilling of 
expression and signs of resistance. Both of these responses, 
however, stem from the stigma experienced, and thus even the 
engagement response should not dispel concern. 
In two quantitative studies, members of the U.S. 
Muslim community, but not a majority, reported changing their 
behavior in response to government scrutiny of their 
community. In the study of New York Muslims described 
above, one in five surveyed reported altering behavior in 
response to general law enforcement scrutiny of Muslims, 
including changes in attendance at group prayers in a mosque 
(20 percent of respondents), manner of dress (22 percent), 
everyday activities (17 percent), and travel behavior (26 
percent).164 A 2007 study of Muslim Americans found more 
modest changes: while almost three-quarters of Muslims 
surveyed believed that the government was monitoring the 
general activities and Internet usage of Muslims, only 11.6 
percent of respondents reported changing their general 
activities due to that concern, and 8.4 percent reported 
changing their Internet usage.165 
These numbers are not negligible: assuming a population 
of two million Muslims in the United States, even 10 percent of 
U.S. Muslims represents two hundred thousand people who cease 
to engage in lawful expressive behavior for fear of government 
scrutiny. In addition, the proportion of individuals who report 
changing their behavior might be greater in particular subsets of 
the Muslim community: immigrants, working class community 
  
 162 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 163 VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66-67; HAN, supra note 152, at 
16-18; Sally Howell & Amaney Jamal, The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks, in 
CITIZENSHIP AND CRISIS: ARAB DETROIT AFTER 9/11, at 87-88 (2009). 
 164 Tyler et al., supra note 87, at 396. 
 165 Sidhu, supra note 16, at 390-91. 
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members, or those who directly experience law enforcement 
scrutiny166 might feel particularly vulnerable. 
Moreover, studies that measure the extent to which 
individuals report changing their behavior may underestimate 
the extent of more subtle, but potentially more pervasive, 
changes in behavior. A practicing Muslim, for instance, might 
not stop going to the mosque, but might hesitate to speak freely 
with other worshippers. Other questions (not asked in these 
studies) might elicit evidence of subtler changes: “Do you feel 
that you must reassure co-workers about your loyalty before 
participating in a casual workplace conversation about events 
in the Middle East?” “Do you hesitate to speak in Arabic or 
perform ritual prayers in public for fear of drawing suspicion?” 
Focusing on the hard impacts of surveillance (the 
decision to avoid a political gathering) misses the soft impacts 
that may affect communities in equal or greater fashion (the 
diminished sense of trust in others and openness in 
communication). Several scholars have argued that the 
surveillance of mosques intrudes on the sense of security that 
worshippers seek at a place of worship, and surveillance of any 
community-based or political organization diminishes trust 
within the group, with longer-term effects on the quality of 
association.167 Aziz Huq argues further that law enforcement’s 
use of religious speech to signal high-risk terrorist threats 
interferes with religious communities’ “epistemic autonomy”—
their “collective interest . . . in determining the content and 
direction of . . . religious beliefs without interference by the 
government.”168 Thus, any assessment of chilling effects must 
take into account the cumulative impact of subtle, smaller 
changes and the qualitative aspects of changed behavior.  
B. Suppression and Overbreadth in First Amendment 
Profiling 
Accepting that First Amendment profiling, at least in 
some cases, imposes significant stigmatic costs and chilling 
  
 166 Neither study separated out the impact on individuals who had personally 
faced law enforcement scrutiny from that of the Muslim community at large. 
 167 Lininger, supra note 16, at 1233-36; Harris, supra note 16, at 166-68; 
Fisher, supra note 16, at 653. See, e.g., Dennis Wagner, FBI’s Queries of Muslims Spurs 
Anxiety, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://arizona.indymedia.org/ 
news/2004/10/22062.php (reporting Muslim community leader’s statement that FBI 
interviews led to “creeping distrust,” leading people to question whether acquaintances 
might report their words to the government); see also CAINKAR, supra note 20, at 185-86. 
 168 Huq, supra note 16, at 852-53. 
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effects does not tell us whether the practice in a given instance 
is justified. Not every law enforcement practice that qualifies 
as First Amendment profiling is wrong. For instance, few 
would argue that law enforcement should not scrutinize an 
influential religious leader advocating terrorist attacks in the 
United States or a person who has joined al Qaeda, at least in 
order to determine whether the person is actively recruiting or 
assisting terrorists. The permissible scope of government 
investigation exceeds the permissible scope of government 
criminalization: the government may investigate, in an effort to 
uncover potential violations of the law or threats to national 
security, activities that it cannot constitutionally ban.169 The 
government could not, consistent with the First Amendment, 
outlaw the advocacy of terrorism or a person’s membership in a 
terrorist organization unless those activities cross certain 
lines—e.g., the advocacy is directed at producing “imminent 
lawless action and is likely to” have such an effect,170 the 
member has a specific intent to further the organization’s 
illegal aims,171 or either activity constitutes material support to 
a designated foreign terrorist organization.172 Such activities, 
even without crossing these lines, may be so relevant to 
uncovering actual violations of the law that the government 
may legitimately investigate them. 
These are relatively clear examples; even civil 
libertarians might agree that a close enough nexus exists 
between the protected activity and an actual threat in order to 
permit First Amendment profiling. On these narrow facts, a 
three-step justification for First Amendment profiling 
articulated by scholars and law enforcement officials seems 
least objectionable. First, because of the potential of grave 
harm from terrorism, investigators must identify terrorists 
early and prevent acts of violence in advance of the commission 
of any criminal act.173 Second, these scholars and officials argue, 
because terrorists are elusive and hard to find, investigators 
need to cast their net broadly to identify those who pose a 
  
 169 See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 14 
(2002); Fisher, supra note 16, at 672. 
 170 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 171 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961). 
 172 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730-31 (2010). 
 173 RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 114 (2006); Huq, supra note 16, at 839-42. 
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threat.174 Third, they argue that where the threat stems from 
ideologically motivated violence, evidence of that ideology 
(whether religious or political) is a relevant and rational basis 
for suspicion.175 
Of course, in most cases, the nexus between ideology 
and threat will not be as clear. At that point, the justifications 
for First Amendment profiling encounter serious questions. 
While terrorists may act out of religious or political motivation, 
the use of individuals’ religious or political views or behavior to 
“predict” threats is fraught with peril. Claims about the 
relevance of ideological linkages to violence may appeal to 
intuition rather than actual evidence. In fact, research 
suggests that the relationship between religion and terrorism 
is complicated and contested: for instance, while a New York 
Police Department report cites a turn to religion as a risk 
factor for “radicalization” and identifies mosques, student 
associations, and nongovernmental organizations as examples 
of hubs where radicalizing Muslims might gather,176 one 
academic study suggests that increased religious education and 
greater immersion in Muslim social institutions diminishes the 
religious naïveté and social isolation that can feed extremism.177 
Even assuming that the “experts” could arrive at an accurate 
and sophisticated understanding of the linkages between 
terrorism and ideology, there is good reason to question how 
well law enforcement agencies could apply that information.178 
Beyond these reasons to doubt the effectiveness of First 
Amendment profiling, the primary objection rests on a broader 
  
 174 POSNER, supra note 173, at 114. 
 175 Id. at 116; see also OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 27-28 (providing 
examples of where it would be “rational and permissible” for the FBI to consider 
religious adherence, affiliations, or practices in an investigation). 
 176 MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 30-31 (2007). 
 177 Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 39, 63-64 (2010); DAVID SCHANZER ET AL., ANTI-TERROR LESSONS OF MUSLIM-
AMERICANS 28-29, 45 (2010). 
 178 See Huq, supra note 16, at 868-73 (arguing that use of religious speech as a 
counterterrorism signal will present high risks of error). Recent news reports on the 
biased content of counterterrorism training sessions for law enforcement officials, and the 
lack of vetting for self-declared terrorism experts, suggest even greater reason to question 
the capability of law enforcement agencies to obtain and apply accurate information on 
the relationship between religious beliefs and terrorist threats. See, e.g., Lisa Fernandez, 
Local Groups Allege Biased Training Colors FBI Dealings with American Muslims, 
MERCURYNEWS.COM, http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci_19122246 (last updated 
Oct. 16, 2011); Dina Temple-Raston, Terrorism Training Casts Pall over Muslim 
Employee, NPR (July 18, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/18/137712352/terrorism-
training-casts-pall-over-muslim-employee.  
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principle: where a large number of innocent people engage in 
religious or political behavior alleged to be linked to an actual 
threat, law enforcement should not define threats so broadly as 
to sweep in substantial amounts of protected expression. If, at 
one end of the spectrum, an influential religious leader’s 
advocacy of terrorist attacks in the United States or a person’s 
membership in al Qaeda justifies law enforcement attention, 
law enforcement scrutiny directed at those who don Islamic 
garb or become active in social causes—behaviors identified by 
the New York Police Department report as “signatures” of the 
“second stage of radicalization”179—is just as clearly unjustified. 
So when is First Amendment profiling actually wrong? I 
argue that there are two situations where the government 
oversteps its bounds. First, it is wrong for the government to 
target people for investigation on account of lawful expression 
or association for the purpose of suppressing protected 
expression or association (what I label the suppression 
concern). Second, First Amendment profiling is wrong to the 
extent that the investigation imposes too great a burden on 
protected expression in relation to the government interest at 
hand (the overbreadth concern).180 Thus, First Amendment 
profiling directed at the suppression of protected speech is 
presumptively wrong; First Amendment profiling not involving 
deliberate suppression is suspect but not categorically wrong. 
1. The Suppression Concern 
The principle behind the suppression concern is that if 
the government cannot criminalize expression, it cannot use 
indirect methods of coercion to achieve the same ends. This 
principle applies whether the government’s ultimate goal is 
illegitimate (suppression of dissent or religious views out of 
hostility or self-interest) or legitimate (the prevention of 
violence), so long as the immediate objective is suppression of 
lawful speech or association. Although one might distinguish, 
at a theoretical level, between a purpose to suppress speech 
based on hostility to ideas and a purpose to suppress speech to 
prevent violence, the distinction collapses in the national-
  
 179 SILBER & BHATT, supra note 176, at 30-31; see also Huq, supra note 177, at 57. 
 180 In using the term “overbreadth,” I am not referring to the separate First 
Amendment standing doctrine that allows a party to challenge the constitutionality of 
a statute on the grounds that it impermissibly prohibits the speech of others, even if 
the party’s own speech could constitutionally be prohibited. See generally Note, 
Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (2010). 
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security context, where hostility to ideas almost always takes 
the form of a belief that particular ideas are dangerous and 
likely to produce harm.181 Thus, the suppression concern 
includes the scenario where a government official who believes 
that a particular religious movement inspires some individuals 
to embrace violence harasses adherents to prevent them from 
worshipping together—even if the official’s ultimate purpose is 
to forestall acts of violence. 
Though investigations today may raise the suppression 
concern, there is a relatively broad consensus that the 
purposeful use of investigations to suppress lawful expression 
is wrong. For instance, the FBI officially proscribes 
investigations of First Amendment activities solely for the 
purpose of monitoring or abridging lawful expression.182 That 
principle stems from wide condemnation of the agency’s 
historical abuses: a congressional investigation concluded that 
from 1956 to 1971, the FBI had “conducted a sophisticated 
vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise 
of First Amendment rights of speech and association,”183 
including the use of wiretaps and bugs to surveil and discredit 
Dr. Martin Luther King.184 Despite near consensus today that 
investigations should not aim to disrupt lawful speech, that 
consensus may shift as federal agencies develop a counter-
radicalization strategy to prevent and disrupt Islamic 
extremism within the United States, leading to renewed debate 
over government-sponsored efforts to suppress speech.185 
2. The Overbreadth Concern 
Second, though less obvious, First Amendment profiling 
raises the concern that regardless of motive—even assuming 
that law enforcement agents are acting for the legitimate 
purpose of investigating a terrorist threat—the government 
  
 181 Thus, in this context, the distinction Elena Kagan draws between 
“ideological” and “harm-based” motives for government actions collapses—as Kagan 
anticipated in suggesting that in certain cases, “the two kinds of motives become 
hopelessly entangled . . . in a kind of endless feedback loop.” Elena Kagan, Private 
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 433-35 (1996). 
 182 MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 13. 
 183 CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 142, at 3. 
 184 See id. at 81-86. For other examples of FBI investigations focused on First 
Amendment expression, see generally COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 169. 
 185 See Ken Dilanian, Fighting Threats from Within: Homegrown Terrorist 
Plots Spur a Search for a Strategy, but How Does the Government Battle an Ideology?, 
L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at 1. 
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may have defined threats too broadly, overclassifying innocent 
expression and association to improperly create a legitimate 
basis for scrutiny. There are two reasons why law enforcement 
investigations with a legitimate purpose should raise First 
Amendment concerns. First, even where the purpose of an 
investigation is not the suppression of expression, hostility to 
that expression may well influence the scope and shape of the 
investigation.186 In Tabbaa, for example, CBP officials ordered 
intrusive screening measures on Muslims returning from a 
conference as a response to intelligence concerning the presence 
of suspected terrorists at the event. But unspoken assumptions 
that an Islamic conference was likely to be suspicious might well 
have colored the judgment that it was rational—and fair—to stop 
all people returning from a diverse gathering of thirteen thousand 
people based on the possibility that they may have met a terrorist 
at the event.187 The unpopular and subordinate status of the 
communities affected may color threat perceptions, reduce 
empathy for innocent people affected by an investigation, or 
diminish fears of political backlash.188 For instance, the 
knowledge that political leaders and the U.S. public would not 
raise howls of protest at the singling out of participants at an 
Islamic conference might well have lessened the perceived costs 
of a decision to target them. 
The second reason for the overbreadth concern is that 
even where hostility to speech or speakers does not influence 
an investigation, First Amendment profiling is likely to result 
in particularly grave harms. Where an investigative decision 
on its face turns on First Amendment expression or association, 
it is particularly likely to result in stigmatic harm and chilled 
  
 186 See Kagan, supra note 181, at 435 (arguing that hostility to speech may 
lead the government to overestimate the harm the speech may cause). 
 187 One commentator writes of Tabbaa that questioning attendees at an Islamic 
conference based on the presence of a suspected terrorist is no more “profiling” than 
questioning attendees at a State Fair for similar reasons, because it does not rely on 
stereotyping but on “suspect description.” R. Richard Banks, Group Harms in Antiterrorism 
Efforts: A Pervasive Problem with No Simple Solution, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 198, 199 
(2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/civil-rights/group-harms-
in-antiterrorism-efforts:-a-pervasive-problem-with-no-simple-solution/. This conclusion 
overlooks the likelihood of group-based assumptions behind investigators’ decisions: it is 
hard to imagine that CBP would have detained, fingerprinted, and photographed everyone 
returning from a state fair attended by thirteen thousand people rather than choosing more 
tailored means to identify those who posed a threat. 
 188 See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976) (arguing that government decisions not based on racial 
animus may still be affected by “racially selective sympathy and indifference” to other 
racial groups); see also Hussain, supra note 16, at 945 (discussing possibility of 
unconscious and cognitive biases in investigative decisions). 
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expression. Consider a hypothetical in which the FBI, 
responding to the attempted Times Square bomber Faisal 
Shahzad’s claims that U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan 
motivated him,189 began questioning hundreds of people who 
signed a petition protesting civilian deaths from drone strikes. 
The FBI might justify the interviews as an intelligence 
assessment to measure potential threats presented by 
Pakistani Americans opposed to U.S. policies. While such an 
inquiry might have a “legitimate” purpose—at least one that 
the current attorney general guidelines deems proper—the 
means employed would be well out of proportion to the declared 
objective and seriously likely to discourage others from voicing 
similar opposition to U.S. policies. Even where hostility to the 
ideas expressed does not influence an investigation, the 
government’s use of First Amendment expression as a basis for 
selecting interviewees can result in grave harm to those 
questioned and their broader communities. 
In recent years, some federal agencies have themselves 
concluded that certain investigative or intelligence activities 
they conducted were overbroad. For instance, the Department of 
Homeland Security distributed and then rescinded intelligence 
on certain First Amendment activities of U.S. Muslims, deeming 
it a violation of department policy.190 A Department of Justice 
Inspector General review of the FBI’s investigations of several 
domestic advocacy groups concluded that while the FBI did not 
deliberately target groups on account of their First Amendment 
activities, it had weak factual support for opening or continuing 
certain investigations.191 
The overbreadth concern also draws support from history: 
David Cole and James Dempsey have argued, for instance, that 
the FBI investigation in the 1980s of the Committee in Support 
for the People of El Salvador, a peaceful political organization, 
continued and expanded despite a slim factual basis for concern.192 
  
 189 Benjamin Weiser, A Guilty Plea in Plot to Bomb Times Square, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2010, at A1. 
 190 Sebastian Rotella, Intelligence Note on Nation of Islam Pulled: Homeland 
Security Rescinds the 2007 Analysis After Deciding It Broke Rules on Information 
Collection, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A26. 
 191 OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC 
ADVOCACY GROUPS 186-87 (2010). But see A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIVE 
ACTIVITIES CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROTESTORS, supra note 145, at 3 (finding that the 
FBI did not improperly target potential protestors at national political conventions to 
chill First Amendment activities). 
 192 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 169, at 22-23. 
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The FBI later admitted that the investigation, which generated 
files on 2376 individuals and 1330 groups, was improperly focused 
on First Amendment activities.193 
The most difficult challenge, of course, is making a 
coherent distinction between permissible First Amendment 
profiling and impermissible overbreadth, especially in 
interviews. Indeed, the overbreadth concern, unlike the 
suppression concern, does not suggest any bright line. Rather, 
overbreadth suggests a contextual, case-by-case determination 
of whether there is a tight enough nexus between the targeted 
expression and an actual threat of violence to justify the 
particular burden on First Amendment rights. 
Two examples of actual interviews involving First 
Amendment profiling might help illustrate relevant 
considerations. First, as this article has argued, the First 
Amendment profiling in Tabbaa was overbroad, and the case 
was wrongly decided. There, the concern was the possibility of 
individuals using the mainstream gathering as a cover for 
meeting terrorist suspects. The size of the event (thirteen 
thousand participants), however, made any individual 
participant’s probability of meeting suspects fairly small. In 
addition, the security measures taken, including interviews, 
lengthy detentions, fingerprinting, and the like were 
particularly stigmatizing and intrusive. Moreover, surveillance 
of specific suspects at the conference itself, which presumably 
could have been arranged through the cooperation of the 
Canadian government, suggested a ready alternative.194 Given 
these facts, the nexus between the alleged security threat and 
the First Amendment trigger for the selection of interviewees—
attendance at the conference—was too attenuated to justify the 
particularly burdensome measures taken. 
Second, a more difficult case might be the FBI’s 
numerous interviews of students who attended a sixteen-day 
Houston Islamic conference in 2008 that Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man who attempted to blow up an 
  
 193 Id. at 24, 33. 
 194 The Tabbaa court rejected this alternative on the grounds that “the U.S. 
government cannot freely conduct surveillance . . . in Canada,” without any 
explanation of why U.S. authorities could not coordinate with Canadian law 
enforcement to arrange any required surveillance. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 104 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
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airliner in December 2009, also attended.195 The conference was 
sponsored by an Islamic religious institute known to teach a 
particularly conservative brand of Islam, though it did not 
advocate violence.196 Following the attempted bombing, the FBI 
initially sought to interview all 156 participants and indeed 
interviewed an unknown (but apparently large) number.197 
Perhaps the FBI reasoned that other students who attended 
could provide information on Abdulmutallab, that a teacher at 
the conference might have influenced both Abdulmutallab and 
other attendees, or that the conference might have brought 
together like-minded individuals. How should we evaluate this 
case, which at first glance bears some resemblance to Tabbaa? 
Several considerations inform this inquiry. One 
consideration involves the burden imposed: the FBI interviews 
likely did not create the same direct burden as the compulsory 
and extensive screening measures taken in Tabbaa. On the 
other hand, especially if the FBI approached all or nearly all 
the 156 participants, these interviews may well have chilled 
those who would otherwise wish to attend the institute’s 
events. A second consideration is the strength of the nexus 
between the potential terrorist threat and the First 
Amendment trigger. Here, there had been an actual terrorist 
attempt, and compared to Tabbaa, the relatively small number 
of participants and the duration of the conference suggests a 
greater probability of other students having met 
Abdulmutallab or some other common source of influence. Also 
relevant is that a “tiny fraction” of the institute’s other 
students (not those subject to the interviews) had turned to 
violence.198 A third consideration is the scope of the questioning: 
to the extent it focused on Abdulmutallab, it would be much 
less problematic than broad-based inquiries that supposed that 
the interviewees at large presented a threat. Ultimately, 
whether these interviews were overbroad might come down to 
the strength of the FBI’s preexisting evidence that the institute 
attracted students drawn to violence and the scale and content 
of the interviews conducted. 
These examples suggest the complexity of the fact-
specific inquiry required for determining overbreadth. Though 
  
 195 Andrea Elliott, Why Yasir Qadhi Wants to Talk About Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 17, 2011, (Magazine), at MM34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/ 
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deciding when First Amendment profiling is permissible may 
not be easy, the real stigma and chilling effects of the practice, 
combined with the historical record of abuses, make that 
inquiry critical. In the next part, I argue that courts should 
undertake that inquiry through heightened scrutiny of First 
Amendment profiling, and that existing First Amendment 
doctrine provides a foundation for such review. 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROFILING IN THE COURTS 
Given the dual concerns of suppression and overbreadth 
raised by First Amendment profiling, courts ought to subject 
investigations involving First Amendment profiling, including 
interviews, to heightened scrutiny whenever plaintiffs 
establish that they have faced a substantial burden on their 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or association.199 
This article proposes a two-part test for such cases. A court 
should inquire first whether the government had a compelling 
interest in conducting the practice in question. In that step, the 
government will usually be able to prevail, citing national 
security, except in the rare case where direct evidence indicates 
a purpose to suppress speech or some other illegitimate reason 
for an investigation—in which case, the government would lose 
without further balancing. Assuming that the government 
establishes a compelling interest, the court should then query 
whether the means employed were “narrowly tailored” to 
serving the declared objective. The availability of less 
restrictive means for the government to resolve security 
concerns ought to create a rebuttable presumption that the 
investigation was overbroad. This heightened scrutiny would 
be neither traditional strict scrutiny weighted heavily against 
constitutionality nor a deferential balancing analysis in which 
the government always wins.200 
While suppression and overbreadth are conceptually 
distinct, the test here would seek to address both concerns. The 
existence of a suppression purpose on the facts of any particular 
case can often be detected only from a demonstration of 
  
 199 I focus in this article on the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech 
and association, which cover religious speech and association, rather than the separate 
religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
 200 A point of comparison might be the approach in freedom of association 
claims, where courts query whether state interests may be achieved by other means 
“significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 622 (1984), not whether the means employed were the least restrictive alternative. 
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overbreadth. When government agents conduct an investigation 
in order to suppress protected speech, the invidious purpose is 
rarely apparent; law enforcement will almost always provide 
some facially legitimate reason for an improper investigation. 
Thus, the most plausible route to “uncover” an actual 
suppression purpose is through demonstrating such a remote 
connection between the investigated activity and an actual 
threat, or a burden on speech so disproportionate to the declared 
objective as to support the inference that no legitimate 
investigative purpose existed.201 
I do not argue that courts, as opposed to Congress or 
administrative agencies, are necessarily best positioned to 
resolve First Amendment concerns regarding law enforcement 
investigations. Others have extensively debated the 
effectiveness and desirability of judicial enforcement of civil 
rights claims.202 But political process theory suggests that 
where terrorism investigations predominantly affect 
communities that are subject to widespread public hostility, 
Congress and executive agencies may lack the political will to 
fully resolve concerns stemming from such investigations.203 
While executive oversight institutions, such as the Department 
of Justice Inspector General, have triggered impressive reform 
of certain investigative practices, even strong Inspector 
General reviews may not substantially constrain agency 
discretion to prevent future abuse, and these institutions 
cannot define substantive rights that would bind agency 
conduct.204 Moreover, even if agency policies and guidelines are 
more likely to directly influence law enforcement behavior than 
court decisions, court decisions often set the baseline for agency 
guidelines: the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations 
Guide, for instance, references judicial opinions heavily in 
outlining First Amendment constraints on investigations.205  
  
 201 See Kagan, supra note 181, at 440-41. 
 202 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law 
of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need 
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 203 For the classic political process argument for searching judicial review, see 
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The case for heightened scrutiny is justifiable, though 
not compelled, by existing law. The law on First Amendment 
profiling is deeply unsettled, as lower courts since the 1970s 
have struggled to answer the many questions the Supreme 
Court has left open. The first important question that has 
divided lower courts evaluating First Amendment profiling 
involves the circumstances in which plaintiffs challenging law 
enforcement investigations have suffered sufficient abridgment 
of their First Amendment rights. The harm from law 
enforcement investigations is less direct and certain than the 
harm from classic restrictions on speech or associational rights 
because investigations do not typically prohibit someone from 
expressing a view or associating with an organization. Lower 
courts since the 1970s have primarily confronted the question of 
sufficient harm as an issue of standing, and many have denied 
standing to plaintiffs challenging surveillance or investigations. 
Despite the restrictive standing doctrine created in this context, 
I argue that lower court decisions, and the Supreme Court 
precedent on which they rely, suggest that some plaintiffs 
challenging law enforcement interviews would be able to 
establish standing—overcoming a threshold hurdle that has 
stymied other First Amendment claims against covert 
surveillance or the observation of religious or political events. 
While plaintiffs will still need to establish, on the merits, that 
they suffered substantial harm, standing doctrine in this context 
already screens out most cases involving minimal harm, and the 
stigmatic and chilling effects of interviews should further help 
plaintiffs demonstrate the seriousness of harm suffered. 
A second question that has divided lower courts is 
whether the government’s articulation of a plausible legitimate 
purpose for a law enforcement investigation ends the First 
Amendment inquiry, or whether courts ought to apply 
heightened scrutiny to probe the “fit” between the claimed 
purpose and the means employed—either because heightened 
scrutiny is required to uncover an illicit motive (the 
suppression concern) or because even an investigation with an 
acknowledged legitimate purpose may still sweep too broadly 
in burdening First Amendment rights (the overbreadth 
concern). Despite the fundamental importance of this question, 
only one recent piece—an article by Lawrence Rosenthal 
discussed below—has discussed this divide, concluding that 
First Amendment investigations need not satisfy heightened 
2011] QUESTIONING LAW ENFORCEMENT 83 
scrutiny.206 I examine the split among lower courts on First 
Amendment profiling and challenge the view that First 
Amendment doctrine does not support heightened scrutiny for 
investigations. In doing so, I address the most significant 
objection to this view: the idea that narrow tailoring 
requirements would undermine the ability of law enforcement 
to identify and preempt potential threats. 
A. The Harm from Investigations 
1. The Supreme Court’s Chilling Effects Cases Through 
Laird 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court made clear 
that government actions that indirectly burden, rather than 
directly restrict, speech or association could violate the First 
Amendment.207 Several classic cases establishing this principle 
arose out of investigations or inquiries into the membership of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) or “subversive” organizations. Thus, in 
NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the state of 
Alabama had failed to show a compelling justification for 
requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list, which the 
state sought as part of an investigation into whether the group 
had complied with a corporate registration requirement.208 The 
Court recognized that although the requirement did not 
directly abridge NAACP members’ freedom to associate, the 
practical consequence of disclosure would be to subject 
members to public threats and reprisals—and chill the 
organization’s lawful political advocacy.209 
Although in many cases, the Court surely suspected an 
illicit government motive behind an investigation—the 
suppression concern—these decisions did not conclude that the 
government purposes articulated were pretextual or 
implausible. For instance, in Shelton v. Tucker, the Court 
explicitly acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in 
investigating a public employee’s associational ties, but 
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 207 See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 
(1963) (citations omitted); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); NAACP v. 
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 208 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466. 
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nevertheless concluded that that interest did not justify the 
breadth of the inquiry undertaken.210 
Moreover, the Court sometimes proved willing to engage 
in a rigorous examination of the facts in finding an insufficient 
“fit” between the state interest articulated and the information-
gathering measure employed. Thus, in Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigative Committee, the Court held that while 
state legislatures had broad power to investigate possible 
subversive activities, a Florida legislative committee’s demand 
that the NAACP disclose whether fourteen “known” 
Communists were members of the association was not 
supported by “a substantial relation between the information 
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state 
interest.”211 The state presented colorable evidence of 
Communist attempts to participate in the NAACP: some of the 
fourteen alleged Communists had attended NAACP meetings, 
one informant had “been instructed to infiltrate the NAACP,” 
the organization had passed “antisubversion” resolutions that 
acknowledged attempts by Communists to take over the group, 
and one or two of the fourteen had given talks to the 
organization or distributed leaflets for the group.212 Yet the 
Court rejected this evidence, fact by fact, as “merely indirect, 
less than unequivocal, and mostly hearsay testimony.”213 
Without deferring to either the government’s explanation for 
the investigation or its interpretation of the facts, the Court 
conducted its own, searching inquiry into whether the evidence 
justified the investigation.214 
In these cases, the Court explicitly characterized the 
harm resulting from government investigative practices as the 
chilling effect such practices would have on legitimate 
expression and association. For instance, Alabama’s attempt to 
compel disclosure of the NAACP’s membership would hinder 
the group’s advocacy efforts by dissuading individuals from 
participating out of fear of exposure.215 Less explicitly, the 
decisions recognize that the chilling effect on First Amendment 
  
 210 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490. 
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 212 Id. at 552-54, 554 n.6. 
 213 Id. at 555. 
 214 Gibson distinguished several earlier decisions that upheld disclosure 
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rights results from an exercise of state power that subjects 
individuals to stigma—either directly or by exposing people to 
public hostility. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court compared 
the compelled disclosure of group affiliation to a “requirement 
that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties 
wear identifying armbands,” drawing an implicit connection to 
the branding of minority or dissenting communities.216 In a case 
involving legislative investigations into First Amendment 
views, the Court noted that such investigations could impose 
the “stain of the stamp of disloyalty” as significant as might 
result from an actual loss of employment.217  
In spite of these decisions recognizing the stigmatic 
harm and chilling effects of indirect government burdens on 
expression, in 1972, the Court curbed the practical reach of 
these doctrines by restricting standing to challenge 
surveillance. In Laird v. Tatum, the Court announced that 
while indirect burdens on First Amendment rights might 
warrant constitutional review, individuals did not have 
standing to challenge government surveillance that created 
only a “subjective ‘chill’” on political activities.218 Laird remains 
the Court’s last word on First Amendment claims against 
government surveillance of political activities, and has 
profoundly affected First Amendment challenges to law 
enforcement investigations and surveillance. 
In Laird, a group of political activists and organizations 
sought to enjoin the army’s collection of intelligence regarding 
their lawful political activities,219 claiming that the army had 
surveilled them and continued to maintain files regarding their 
political activities.220 The army acknowledged conducting 
surveillance (mostly through public sources such as the news 
media and attendance at public meetings) of political activities 
with the potential to result in civil disorder.221 The Court 
distinguished the surveillance in Laird from past “‘chilling’ 
effect” cases, where “the challenged exercise of governmental 
power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,” 
and plaintiffs were or would be “subject to the regulations, 
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proscriptions, or compulsions” that they were contesting.222 For 
instance, in past cases, plaintiffs stood to lose out on state bar 
membership or employment if they did not take loyalty oaths or 
answer questions about their political associations.223 In Laird, 
by contrast, the Court characterized the plaintiffs’ claims as 
arising from “the mere existence, without more, of a 
governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is 
alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for 
the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose.”224 A 
“subjective ‘chill’” alone, such as the plaintiffs’ fears that the 
army might in the future misuse the information it had collected 
against them, could not substitute for a “claim of specific present 
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”225  
Although Laird did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment claims, the five-to-four opinion suggested a 
reluctance to credit the stigma of general surveillance in the 
absence of other state action directly affecting the plaintiffs. But 
the Court dealt there with information-gathering from largely 
public sources, noting that the lower court described the 
investigation as uncovering no more than what a good newspaper 
reporter might uncover from attending meetings and clipping 
articles.226 The plaintiffs did not allege any law enforcement 
interviews of individuals or intimidating contacts between 
individuals and army officers, and learned of the army’s 
surveillance through a magazine article that described the 
program.227 The Court qualified its concern over federal courts 
monitoring “the wisdom and soundness of Executive action” by 
making clear that an actual or immediately threatened injury 
could properly subject army surveillance to judicial review.228 
Thus, the Court left open the ability of courts to scrutinize 
overbroad and stigmatizing investigations in a case where 
plaintiffs could demonstrate “objective” harm. 
2. Establishing Standing for Interviews, Post-Laird 
Since Laird, lower courts facing First Amendment 
claims against law enforcement investigations have grappled 
  
 222 Laird, 408 U.S at 11. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 10. 
 225 Id. at 13-14. 
 226 Id. at 9 (quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
 227 Id. at 2 n.1. 
 228 Id. at 15-16. 
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with the threshold question of whether the plaintiffs have 
standing to sue. A review of these decisions suggests that at 
least some plaintiffs challenging law enforcement interviews as 
unjustified or overbroad should be able to establish standing.  
In the case of CBP interviews, where travelers cannot 
enter the United States without satisfying border inspectors, 
Laird is unlikely to present a challenge. Beyond a chilling 
effect, individuals interviewed on account of First Amendment 
expression can point to objective harm from interviews, 
minimally the detention they experienced—often in addition to 
intrusive searches, handcuffing or displays of physical force, or 
other screening measures.229 In contexts involving the compelled 
disclosure of information, the Supreme Court has never held 
that organizations or individuals personally subject to that 
compulsion lacked standing. Although CBP presumably cannot 
deny entry altogether to U.S. citizens who refuse to speak, CBP 
can delay entry or subject people to more intense searches; 
even with a legal right to enter, U.S. citizens must still await 
the permission of border inspectors. Thus, for purposes of 
standing, courts should view border interviews as a type of 
involuntary detention, creating an objective injury. 
FBI interviews, by contrast, present a more difficult 
question because they are ostensibly voluntary, and plaintiffs 
will not always be able to establish objective injury beyond the 
stigma or chilling effects of the practice. As Scott Michelman and 
others have described, some courts have interpreted Laird 
broadly to foreclose standing for claims of chilling effect injuries 
that did not arise out “of ‘regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory’ 
government action.”230 For instance, the lead opinion in a Sixth 
Circuit case adopted this position and denied standing to 
plaintiffs who challenged the National Security Administration’s 
warrantless wiretapping program; the plaintiffs could not 
establish that they were “regulated, constrained, or compelled 
directly by the government’s” program.231 
  
 229 Standing was not an issue in Tabbaa, for instance, where on the merits the 
Second Circuit found that even without the “clear chilling of future expressive activity,” 
the screening measures imposed a significant penalty on plaintiffs. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 
509 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 230 Michelman, supra note 16, at 89-93. For additional discussion of standing 
in this context, see Eric Lardiere, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of Political 
Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV. 976, 987-99 (1983); Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, 
Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905, 909-10 (1989).  
 231 ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.); 
see also United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 
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Courts that embrace the broad view of Laird might find 
that chilling-effects claims arising out of FBI interviews are 
nonjusticiable since individuals need not agree to the 
interviews. On the other hand, plaintiffs approached by the 
FBI for interviews are subject to direct, personal contact with 
law enforcement making a request of them—in contrast to the 
surveillance in Laird, which did not require individuals to do 
anything at all.  
Moreover, other courts have not interpreted Laird so 
broadly as to foreclose First Amendment standing in the absence 
of “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory” government action. 
Rather, many courts distinguished cases where litigants showed 
only a “subjective ‘chill’”232 from cases where plaintiffs 
established an “objective” chill, or specific adverse effects, from 
surveillance or investigations. Most recently, the Second Circuit 
held that plaintiffs who had taken costly measures to avoid 
surveillance of their international communications in reasonable 
fear of being monitored had standing to challenge a new foreign 
intelligence surveillance law.233 
These decisions espouse a narrower view of Laird and 
suggest at least three bases for asserting justiciable challenges 
to FBI interviews that burden free expression and association. 
First, plaintiffs can establish standing where they demonstrate 
that interviews were aimed at disrupting speech or lawful 
activities or were undertaken in bad faith.234 
  
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying standing where plaintiffs could not show that executive orders 
authorizing intelligence collection commanded or prohibited them from doing anything). 
 232 Thus, several courts dismissed challenges to otherwise legal law 
enforcement data-gathering, photography, and physical surveillance at political events 
open to the public. See, e.g., Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 
519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 
F.2d 326, 330-33 (2d Cir. 1973); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 1972). 
One court, finding no tangible harm, denied standing to students and teachers who 
claimed that the placement of an undercover police officer in two high school classes 
was ideologically motivated and stifled classroom discussion. Gordon v. Warren Consol. 
Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1983).  
 233 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 234 See, e.g, Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(distinguishing Laird where plaintiff alleged that government surveilled him in 
retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights); Alliance to End Repression v. City 
of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1047, 1050-52 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding standing where 
Chicago police placed informants and undercover agents in senior positions in 
organizations in order to “neutralize” their influence); Founding Church of Scientology 
of Wash., D.C. v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 459 F. Supp. 748, 760 (D.D.C. 
1978) (ruling that Church of Scientology had standing where alleged that federal 
government had disrupted the organization and interfered with its activities); Berlin 
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 149-51 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that 
plaintiffs had standing to contest surveillance activities that included terminating 
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Second, plaintiffs can overcome Laird where the FBI’s 
actions cause individuals objective harm, such as damage to 
reputations or employment prospects. This type of harm 
sometimes occurs when FBI agents approach individuals at 
work and announce to employers that they want to investigate 
an employee. Indeed, in another context, the Supreme Court 
distinguished reputational injuries as a basis for standing from 
the chilling effects found nonjusticiable in Laird.235 Lower 
courts have allowed individuals to challenge employment-
related government loyalty investigations,236 the public 
disclosure of information on individuals targeted,237 and even 
the harm resulting from retention of an investigative file that 
carried a risk of potential future disclosure.238 
Third, an organization that has experienced an 
identifiable decline in membership, support, or reputation from 
FBI interviews, such as a mosque whose congregants are 
questioned, could sue on its own behalf. Courts have ruled that 
organizations have standing to contest law enforcement 
investigative practices that dissuaded their members from 
participating and thereby caused the institutions tangible harm, 
such as a decline in membership or participation.239 For instance, 
the Ninth Circuit found that churches sheltering refugees had 
standing to challenge surveillance of their activities because the 
chilling impact on their members concretely impaired the 
churches from carrying out their ministries.240 
  
plaintiffs’ employment and disrupting lawful activities); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. 
Supp. 952, 957-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding standing where former congressional 
candidate alleged that FBI conspired in bad faith to investigate him for political 
activities); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(finding standing where plaintiffs alleged injuries resulting from use of secret 
informants who induced and initiated criminal activity). 
 235 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1987) (holding that state legislator 
who sought to exhibit foreign films had standing to challenge statutory scheme labeling 
the films “political propaganda” because of potential harm to his reputation and 
professional interests). 
 236 Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1984); Clark v. Library of 
Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 96-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 237 Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1990); Religious 
Soc’y of Friends, 519 F.2d at 1339; Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich. 
1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 238 Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 239 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521-22 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974) (Marshall, J.) 
(finding standing where organization alleged that presence of informants at convention 
would dissuade delegates from participating and jeopardize employment); see also Muslim 
Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 240 Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521-22. 
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While Laird imposes a significant threshold requirement 
that could screen out many FBI encounters—even large-scale 
interviews with significant chilling effects, where plaintiffs did 
not have evidence of bad faith or tangible injuries—it does not 
foreclose First Amendment challenges to CBP or FBI interviews. 
3. Beyond Standing: Establishing Sufficient Harm to 
First Amendment Rights 
Even where courts find standing, they would still need 
to consider the extent of the harm, either as a threshold 
inquiry into whether the harms are “substantial,”241 or at a 
minimum, in determining whether plaintiffs’ injuries ought to 
prevail against governmental interests.242 Interviews that 
survive Laird’s standing doctrine will usually be those where 
the government effectively penalized or compelled plaintiffs in 
some way, as in FBI interviews that cause reputational or 
economic damage or compulsory CBP inspections. 
For CBP interviews, the compulsion involved brings 
potential challenges within the ambit of the Court’s historic 
chilling effect cases, where the government threatened to 
withhold a concrete benefit based on protected expression. 
When CBP prevents individuals who have engaged in protected 
expression from entering the country until they comply with 
extensive and unusual CBP interviews, those individuals 
experience an actual restraint at least as severe as that 
invalidated in Lamont v. Postmaster General.243 There, the 
Court struck down a rule preventing the delivery of foreign 
mail that the Post Office determined was “communist political 
propaganda” until recipients first sent in a reply card 
affirmatively requesting the delivery.244 Though sending a reply 
card to receive mail did not create the same burden as, say, an 
employment requirement to disclose one’s political affiliations, 
  
 241 See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2007) (evaluating 
whether burden on freedom of association was “substantial”). 
 242 See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (distinguishing extent of harm for 
standing purposes from merits inquiry); Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1316 (same). 
 243 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). Whether the First Amendment analysis would 
differ in border inspections of individuals who are not U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents is beyond the scope of this paper. While noncitizens residing in 
the United States enjoy First Amendment rights, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 
(1945), some courts have rejected First Amendment challenges with respect to certain 
immigration decisions. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 
471, 488 (1999); Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 244 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307. 
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the Court found the constraint presented by the regulation 
sufficient to implicate the First Amendment.245 The stigma 
imposed by the designation of certain mail as “communist 
political propaganda,” not just the degree of restraint, made the 
burden on First Amendment rights significant; the Court 
recognized that such a designation would deter individuals 
from reading “what the Federal Government says contains the 
seeds of treason” and has “condemned.”246 
In both FBI and CBP interviews, the stigma resulting 
from a person’s selection for questioning on account of First 
Amendment activities should help plaintiffs establish that a 
law enforcement encounter effectively penalized them for 
engaging in protected expression. That reasoning appeared in 
Tabbaa, where the Second Circuit relied on the stigma of the 
investigative measures taken to conclude that they imposed a 
substantial disability on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
rights. The court found that the extensive security measures 
the plaintiffs experienced, “when others, who had not attended 
the conference, did not have to endure these measures,” 
qualified as a significant “penalty” and one that might 
reasonably deter others from attending similar conferences.247 
In other words, the fact of being singled out for this type of 
scrutiny, not just the “tangible” harm from the screening 
measures employed, led the court to find that the investigation 
substantially interfered with freedom of association.  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s classic First 
Amendment cases of the 1950s and 1960s explicitly recognized 
chilling effects, and implicitly recognized stigma, as a basis for 
harm.248 Moreover, the Court frequently noted that the chilling 
effects on speech or association in those cases were grave 
precisely because the groups or individuals being investigated 
espoused dissenting or unpopular views.249 Thus, the Court 
considered the actual burden of investigations on the specific 
communities involved in the specific social and political 
atmosphere of the time—a backdrop of hostility toward the 
civil rights movement and pervasive fear of communism. 
Courts examining the harm of First Amendment profiling 
  
 245 Id.  
 246 Id. 
 247 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 248 See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. 
 249 See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 555-57 
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 & n.7 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
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today could—and should—consider broader discrimination and 
hostility to U.S. Muslims in evaluating the extent to which 
interviews stigmatize targets and chill expression. 
Beyond the First Amendment context, the Court has 
continued to consider stigmatic harm a judicially cognizable 
injury. In the equal protection context, the Court recognizes—as 
it did most famously in Brown v. Board of Education250—that 
discrimination imposes a noneconomic injury by “stigmatizing 
members of the disfavored group” as “less worthy participants in 
the political community.”251 The Court considers stigma, when 
accompanied by more tangible harm, a factor in determining 
what procedural protections the Due Process Clause requires252 
and as an important reason that laws prohibiting private, 
consensual sexual acts between persons of the same sex violate 
substantive due process.253 In criminal procedure, the Court has 
justified rigorous procedural protections partly because of the 
stigma imposed by a criminal conviction.254  
Thus, the fact that law enforcement interviews do not 
prohibit someone from expressing a view or associating with an 
organization should not categorically prevent individuals 
subjected to FBI or CBP interviews from establishing sufficient 
harm to First Amendment interests, either as a matter of 
standing doctrine or substantive law. Plaintiffs will be on stronger 
ground, however, where they can point to stigma and chilling 
effects in addition to more “objective” compulsion or harm. 
B. Suppression, Overbreadth, and Heightened Scrutiny in 
the Lower Courts 
Post-Laird cases involving challenges to First Amendment 
profiling suggest broad agreement that the First Amendment 
bars investigations that are directed at an illegitimate purpose. 
But courts divide as to whether a showing of a legitimate purpose 
ends the First Amendment inquiry, or whether investigations 
with a legitimate purpose may still sweep too broadly in 
burdening free speech, association, and religion as to violate the 
  
 250 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).  
 251 Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (citation omitted). See 
Lenhardt, supra note 138, at 864-78 (discussing Supreme Court cases on racial stigma). 
 252 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural 
Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
79, 91 (2009) (criticizing limitations of “stigma-plus” doctrine). 
 253 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 254 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000). 
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First Amendment. And courts divide further as to whether 
heightened scrutiny should apply to such investigations. 
Lower court decisions in First Amendment challenges to 
law enforcement investigations have generally concluded that 
the First Amendment bars investigations that are undertaken 
for the purpose of stifling dissent or interfering with lawful 
expressive activities. Beginning in the 1970s, a series of 
lawsuits challenged federal law enforcement and local police 
investigative practices that allegedly aimed to stifle dissent. 
Beyond finding standing where the law enforcement practices 
in question appeared to go beyond “legitimate surveillance,”255 a 
number of courts held that investigations taken for the purpose 
of harassment, interference with lawful activities, or 
suppression of speech would violate the First Amendment.256 
For instance, in Hobson v. Wilson, political activists 
involved in antiwar, civil rights, and other political causes sued 
the FBI and Washington, D.C., police for conspiring to deprive 
them of their rights to free speech and association.257 Plaintiffs 
had a rare smoking gun: internal FBI memoranda explicitly 
described the agency’s “Cointelpro” operation as seeking to 
“disrupt,” “discredit,” and “otherwise neutralize” the lawful 
activities of “New Left” and “Black Nationalist” activists in a 
purported attempt to prevent potential civil strife and 
  
 255 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 220, at 6a.  
 256 United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 752 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the 
government must not investigate for the purpose of violating First Amendment rights, 
and must also have a legitimate law enforcement purpose”); Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 
148, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that tactics that ordinarily do not implicate the First 
Amendment, such as photographing and surveilling a person in public, violate the law 
when undertaken for a wrongful purpose, such as retaliation for a person’s exercise of 
First Amendment rights); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705 (9th Cir. 1989), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) 
(concluding that the use of informants to infiltrate an organization must not be for “the 
purpose of abridging [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms”); Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y 
Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1364, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the FBI’s disruption 
of Socialist Workers Party’s lawful political activities violated First Amendment rights of 
speech and assembly and awarding damages); Ghandi v. Police Dep’t of City of Detroit, 
747 F.2d 338, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that informant’s alleged 
misrepresentation of labor party’s goals, disruption of political campaign, and theft of 
party documents would violate First Amendment); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 
574 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 
272 (6th Cir. 1982) (denying summary judgment on First Amendment claims where 
factual issues existed as to whether FBI investigation of attorney’s political activities was 
in good faith); see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 
549, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (approving settlement agreement forbidding investigation or 
disruption because of First Amendment conduct). 
 257 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
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violence.258 Holding that the alleged interference with plaintiffs’ 
lawful political activities violated “fundamental and well-
established constitutional rights,” the court stated that “it is 
never permissible to impede or deter lawful civil rights/political 
organizations, expression or protest with no other direct 
purpose and no other immediate objective than to counter the 
influence of the target associations.”259 In so ruling, Hobson 
implies that even where the ultimate goal of an investigation is 
legitimate (the prevention of violence), the immediate purpose 
cannot be the disruption of lawful First Amendment activity. 
Cases such as Hobson involved a range of law 
enforcement practices, and one might question whether courts 
would find interviews undertaken to suppress lawful expression 
to be per se impermissible. Decisions involving interviews are 
rare. Yet a case involving the Socialist Workers Party treated 
interviews no differently from other methods calculated to 
disrupt the organization’s lawful political activities, finding 
such methods “patently unconstitutional.”260 The court noted 
that while interviews to gather information are usually a 
legitimate FBI activity, the FBI in that case used interviews of 
the organization’s members and their relatives, employers, and 
landlords to foment paranoia within the group.261 In Zieper v. 
Metzinger, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that FBI 
requests to a filmmaker to remove a film from the Internet that 
could provoke violence would violate the First Amendment if 
they crossed the line from persuasion to coercion.262 The court 
held that the First Amendment prohibits such requests where 
the “totality of the circumstances” amount to an implied 
threat.263 Thus, while courts would likely hold that interviews 
undertaken to suppress lawful activities through harassment 
violate the First Amendment, in circumstances like Zieper, 
courts might consider whether the interviews conveyed an 
implied threat to refrain from expression. 
While lower courts have generally found that a purpose to 
suppress First Amendment rights cannot support an investigation, 
courts divide as to whether a showing of a legitimate purpose ends 
the inquiry, or whether investigations with a legitimate purpose 
may still sweep so broadly that they violate the First Amendment. 
  
 258 Id. at 10. 
 259 Id. at 27.  
 260 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1416-17. 
 261 Id. at 1389. 
 262 474 F.3d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 263 Id. at 70-71. 
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The lower courts further disagree as to whether they should 
employ heightened scrutiny to evaluate an investigation where the 
government provides a facially legitimate reason for its conduct—
either to “smoke out” an actual illicit purpose or to invalidate the 
overbreadth of the investigation. 
Rosenthal, the only commentator to review this split in 
authority, concludes that most courts have held that 
investigations into First Amendment activities require no more 
than a “good faith” law enforcement interest supporting the 
investigation.264 That conclusion, however, understates the extent 
of conflict even within federal circuit courts of appeals. Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit, which had ruled that a government investigation 
threatening First Amendment rights need only be justified by a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose, modified its decision to state 
that that purpose also had to “outweigh[] any harm to First 
Amendment interests.”265 In an influential early decision, the D.C. 
Circuit declared that only a legitimate purpose was necessary to 
subpoena reporters’ phone records.266 In two later decisions, 
though, the D.C. Circuit stated that an investigation with a 
legitimate purpose might still be unconstitutional, and the court 
called for strict scrutiny of investigations that significantly 
burdened First Amendment rights.267 
Amid the confusion, two broad views appear in the case 
law. One set of cases treats the requirement of a legitimate 
purpose as the only limitation that the First Amendment 
places on law enforcement investigations.268 These decisions 
  
 264 Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 39-40. 
 265 United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding 490 
F.3d 1129. 
 266 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 
1030, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 267 Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v. Wilson, 
737 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 268 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to 
suppress, on First Amendment grounds, evidence obtained from the INS’s warrantless 
use of undercover agents and informants to infiltrate church meetings), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); Gordon v. Warren 
Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the placement 
of undercover police officer in two high school classes to uncover drug trafficking did 
not violate the First Amendment, so long as investigation was not designed to control 
content of class discussions); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 593 F.2d at 
1050 (ruling that the government’s good faith issuance of subpoenas to phone 
companies for reporters’ phone records did not abridge First Amendment rights despite 
incidental burden on news gathering); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 572-73 (E.D. 
Mich. 1979) (holding that good faith surveillance of a political activist would not violate 
the First Amendment), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 
272 (6th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Sills, 265 A.2d 678, 688 (N.J. 1970) (holding that 
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generally do not make explicit how a court would ferret out 
such an illegitimate purpose, but the language of these cases 
suggests broad deference to the government’s stated 
justifications rather than any hint of narrow tailoring.269 
Perhaps the strongest statement of this view appears in 
several Seventh Circuit opinions that narrowed landmark 
consent decrees entered against the FBI and Chicago Police 
Department in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago.270 
The defendants in that case acknowledged illegal surveillance 
and disruption of civil liberties organizations, religious activists, 
and political groups.271 Three years after the district court 
approved the consent decree against the FBI, the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted the prohibition on investigating First 
Amendment activities narrowly to bar investigations only where 
there was no “genuine concern for law enforcement.”272 Later 
decisions interpreted the consent decree to exclude “negligent” 
noncompliance273 and modified the Chicago Police Department’s 
order to allow the agency to monitor political extremist groups to 
prevent “ideological terrorism,” regardless of whether the police 
had reasonable suspicion of any crime.274 The Alliance decisions 
make the court’s view clear: the First Amendment itself, not just 
a proper reading of the consent decree, prohibited only those 
investigations with the purpose of interfering with lawful 
expression275 and any more exacting requirement would impede 
law enforcement from protecting public safety.276 
A second set of cases, however, rejects the view that 
under the First Amendment a lawful government purpose is the 
  
courts should not interfere with executive information-gathering in the absence of proof 
of bad faith or arbitrariness). 
 269 One exception is Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 
1513-15 (D. Ariz. 1990), which purported to apply strict scrutiny. In any event, that 
district court’s use of strict scrutiny does not seem compatible with the Ninth Circuit’s 
deferential inquiry in United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 270  Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 
1997); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 271 Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1015.  
 272 Id. Specifically, the court interpreted the decree to permit investigations of 
groups based on their advocacy of violence, even where that advocacy was protected by 
the First Amendment. 
 273 Alliance to End Repression, 119 F.3d at 476 (holding that FBI investigation 
into the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador did not violate the consent 
decree even where the FBI acknowledged widespread negligence). 
 274 Alliance to End Repression, 237 F.3d at 802. 
 275 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1010, 1015-16; Alliance to 
End Repression, 237 F.3d at 800.  
 276 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 237 F.3d at 802. 
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sole test of the validity of a law enforcement investigation and 
instead also requires some form of heightened scrutiny to 
evaluate law enforcement investigations that burden free 
expression.277 Thus, in Clark v. Library of Congress, the D.C. 
Circuit required “exacting scrutiny” of an individual’s claim that 
an FBI investigation into his political activities had chilled his 
expression and prevented him from obtaining further federal 
employment.278 The FBI had conducted a wide-ranging loyalty 
investigation into the plaintiff, mostly through interviews of his 
neighbors, friends, and associates because of allegations that he 
belonged to a lawful socialist organization.279 The court ruled that 
regardless of whether the government “intended to punish or 
coerce the individual . . .[,] [w]here the government’s action 
inflicts a palpable injury on the individual because of his lawful 
beliefs,” it should demonstrate that it employed the “least 
restrictive” alternative.280  
While Clark concerned an FBI investigation for 
employment purposes, other courts suggest a similar test for 
law enforcement investigations directed squarely at uncovering 
security threats. Tabbaa itself, while ultimately ruling against 
the plaintiffs, applied heightened scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ 
freedom-of-association claims.281 The court did not conclude its 
inquiry in finding a legitimate purpose for the investigation 
(identifying individuals who might pose a threat based on CBP 
intelligence on the conference), but further analyzed whether 
the government’s actions “serve[d] compelling state interests, 
  
 277 Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v. 
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 27, 27 n.85, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the “clearly 
established” right to freedom of association included the principle that government 
action taken for a legitimate purpose would nevertheless be unconstitutional 
where it “significantly interfered with protected rights of association, unless the 
[g]overnment . . . demonstrate[d] a substantial . . . or compelling . . . interest” that 
“could not more narrowly be accommodated” (citations omitted)), overruled in part 
on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 227-28 (Cal. 
1975) (requiring strict scrutiny of Los Angeles Police Department’s covert 
surveillance of university classrooms, which police justified as intelligence-
gathering to prevent future criminal activity); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 
102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2007). With the exception of United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 
740, 748-50 (9th Cir. 2007), most courts that express concern for the “overbreadth” 
of an investigation, not just its purpose, require some form of heightened scrutiny. 
 278 750 F.2d at 94. 
 279 Id. at 91. 
 280 Id. at 94. 
 281 509 F.3d at 102. 
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unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that [could not] be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive.”282 
Notably, Clark and Tabbaa were both cases that 
involved claims of more concrete harm—loss of future 
employment and reputational injuries or detentions with 
intrusive screening measures—in addition to chilling effects 
and stigma. These cases suggest that while lower courts are 
split as to whether First Amendment profiling requires 
heightened scrutiny, plaintiffs demonstrating more objective 
harms from interviews are most likely to garner such review. 
C. Addressing Objections to Heightened Scrutiny 
Critics of heightened scrutiny for First Amendment 
profiling argue that judicially-imposed narrow tailoring 
requirements would undermine law enforcement investigations, 
which depend on discretion and flexibility to identify and 
preempt potential threats. One argument is that the Supreme 
Court, out of concern for law enforcement interests, has refused 
to create a higher standard for law enforcement investigations 
burdening First Amendment activities in other contexts. A 
second objection is that heightened scrutiny of First Amendment 
  
 282 Id. at 97, 102. Note that while the court applied strict scrutiny, one judge 
suggested that a less demanding standard might be appropriate because the 
inspections occurred at the border. Id. at 102 n.5. The extent of First Amendment 
protections at U.S. borders is unclear. See generally Timothy Zick, Territoriality and 
the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1543 (2010). In United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 623-24 (1977), the 
Supreme Court ruled that border searches of incoming international mail did not 
violate the First Amendment where existing regulations forbade such searches without 
reasonable suspicion and flatly prohibited reading mail without a search warrant. The 
Court refused comment on the “constitutional reach of the First Amendment” in the 
absence of such protections. Id. at 624. Lower courts have considered First Amendment 
claims in recent challenges to warrantless border searches of laptop computers. Two 
appeals courts rejected First Amendment arguments in refusing to suppress evidence 
of child pornography uncovered through warrantless searches of defendants’ laptop 
computers. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502-07 (4th Cir. 2005). A district court is now considering 
a Fourth and First Amendment challenge to a Department of Homeland Security policy 
permitting searches and copying of laptop computers and other electronic devices 
without reasonable suspicion. See generally Complaint, Abidor v. Napolitano, No. 1:10-
cv-04059 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-
technology-and-liberty/abidor-v-napolitano-complaint. While the border search doctrine 
in Fourth Amendment law rests on the idea that individuals have a lesser expectation 
of privacy at the border, these cases do not suggest that individuals at the border have 
diminished First Amendment rights not to be singled out on the basis of protected 
speech or association. Neither Arnold nor Ickes involved a claim of First Amendment 
profiling, but the separate First Amendment claim that searches of laptop computers 
require individual suspicion because computers store expressive materials. See Arnold, 
533 F.3d at 1006; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506. 
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profiling would place courts in the inappropriate role of second-
guessing law enforcement judgments in critical terrorism-
related investigations. A third argument is that law enforcement 
agents need clear, consistent rules when making decisions about 
whom and how to investigate, and narrow tailoring 
requirements would force law enforcement agents to make 
complicated “balancing” decisions whenever a First Amendment 
interest is implicated. 
First, the argument from precedent, which appears both 
in lower court decisions rejecting heightened scrutiny as well 
as in recent commentary, stems from the fact that the Supreme 
Court in several cases has refused to create greater protections 
for law enforcement investigative practices that burden First 
Amendment rights.283 For instance, the Court has held that the 
ordinary Fourth Amendment warrant requirement sufficiently 
protects First Amendment interests in the seizure of allegedly 
obscene films or the search of a newspaper office, rejecting 
arguments that the expressive materials or institutions 
involved required the provision of a prior adversary hearing or 
a higher showing of necessity.284 
Similarly, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court ruled that 
requiring reporters to testify before grand juries on information 
obtained from confidential sources did not abridge the First 
Amendment, despite claims that the disclosure of confidential 
sources would deter people from speaking freely to reporters and 
diminish the press’s ability to gather news.285 The Court concluded 
that grand jury subpoenas of reporters required only a good faith 
law enforcement interest—creating a standard that Rosenthal 
notes is “remarkably like that employed by the courts that have 
rejected any form of heightened scrutiny for First Amendment 
investigations.”286 The Court deemed the burden on First 
  
 283 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 60-63; Alliance to End Repression v. City 
of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (reargued en banc); Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 284 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (holding that 
ordinary probable cause standard applied to warrant application for sexually explicit 
videos presumptively protected by First Amendment); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978) (holding that Fourth Amendment warrant requirement offered 
sufficient protection in searches of a newspaper office); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 
483, 492 (1973) (holding that the seizure of a single allegedly obscene film for 
evidentiary purposes did not require a prior adversary hearing); see also Univ. of Penn. 
v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (rejecting a university’s First Amendment claim 
that subpoenas requesting tenure-related materials should be supported by a higher 
standard of necessity). 
 285 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972). 
 286 Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 54-56. 
100 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
Amendment rights “incidental” and found any such interest 
outweighed by the public interest in grand juries exercising broad 
power to investigate potential criminal conduct.287 
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to create a special 
standard for searches and seizures of expressive material or 
testimony that potentially chills expression, these decisions do 
not require a rejection of heightened scrutiny in cases of First 
Amendment profiling. These decisions all involved First 
Amendment challenges to law enforcement procedures where 
other protections against government overreaching already 
existed; while affirming the important First Amendment 
interests involved,288 the Court found those procedures 
sufficient to accommodate First Amendment interests. For 
instance, the Court concluded that judges could safeguard First 
Amendment concerns in searches of newspaper offices by 
assessing the ordinary preconditions for a warrant: probable 
cause, specificity regarding the places to be searched or objects 
to be seized, and overall reasonableness.289 As Daniel Solove has 
argued, the search warrant cases leave open the question as to 
how the Court would rule in situations where Fourth 
Amendment procedural protections were unavailable.290 
At first glance, the explanation that other procedural 
protections existed seems less persuasive with respect to 
Branzburg, since grand jury investigations do not provide as 
much protection: the government does not have to demonstrate 
probable cause or satisfy Fourth Amendment standards to 
subpoena witnesses.291 Even so, a person still has recourse to a 
motion to quash or modify a subpoena where “compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive.”292 While the standard by 
which a court considers such motions is deferential,293 the very 
prospect of prior resort to a court provides protection that is 
lacking in the case of FBI or CBP interviews. In addition, 
despite the wide latitude that grand juries enjoy in 
investigating potential crimes, the fact that grand juries are 
convened by courts, not law enforcement agents, and that they 
  
 287 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701. 
 288 See, e.g., P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 873-74; Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564-65. 
 289 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565. 
 290 Solove, supra note 16, at 128-31. 
 291  United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (holding that a 
court can quash a grand jury subpoena only where it finds no reasonable possibility 
that it would produce relevant evidence, but refusing to consider whether the standard 
would differ in cases involving First Amendment interests). 
 292 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
 293 See R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 301. 
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necessitate the seating of sixteen to twenty-three jurors, provide 
some practical restraints on overreaching that are simply 
lacking in FBI and CBP interviews.294 Moreover, the First 
Amendment claim in Branzburg differs from claims in potential 
challenges to First Amendment profiling: the reporters in 
Branzburg alleged a chilling effect on First Amendment activity, 
but not that the decision to subpoena them involved any 
improper First Amendment considerations. The Court has not 
considered whether a different result might be appropriate for 
situations involving a greater threat that hostility to the 
speakers or speech in question affected the decision of who to 
select for questioning.295 Thus, the Court’s unwillingness to 
create additional procedural protections in First Amendment 
challenges to search warrants and grand jury subpoenas does 
not dictate the outcome in other First Amendment profiling 
contexts, including FBI and CBP interviews.296 
A second objection to heightened scrutiny of First 
Amendment profiling is that even if Supreme Court precedent 
is distinguishable, courts should not be in a position to second-
guess law enforcement judgments in critical terrorism-related 
investigations. Especially in the terrorism context, courts and 
critics maintain that law enforcement must be permitted wide 
discretion to identify and pursue potential threats, and the 
  
 294  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1). 
 295 While lower courts, following Branzburg, have rejected a First Amendment 
privilege for journalists challenging grand jury subpoenas, some have suggested a 
higher First Amendment standard might be appropriate for grand jury subpoenas 
involving greater risk that the government was targeting individuals on account of 
expressive activities. See, e.g., In re First Nat’l Bank, 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(granting evidentiary hearing on First Amendment claim); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1996) (enforcing subpoenas where 
government demonstrated a compelling interest in information and a sufficient nexus 
between information sought and subject matter of investigation); In re Grand Jury 
Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding compelling interest and 
substantial relationship, without deciding standard). But see In re Grand Jury 87-3 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 955 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1992) (declining to create 
“substantial relationship” test for subpoenas involving First Amendment claims).  
 296 Rosenthal also argues that in cases involving “no prohibition or direct cost 
on the exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Supreme Court as a general matter 
does not impose heightened scrutiny but simply balances the degree of inhibition 
against the government interests involved. Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 49. Deferential 
balancing on account of the indirect nature of the restraint in question may accurately 
describe the Court’s approach in certain cases, such as Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 
(1987), a case involving a registration requirement applicable to distributors of foreign 
films. But Rosenthal’s statement offers too sweeping a characterization of the Court’s 
practice as a whole. For instance, it does not explain Gibson, where the Court 
rigorously scrutinized government justifications for the investigation of the NAACP 
and limited two Cold War decisions cited by Rosenthal as examples of deferential 
balancing. See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 47-48. 
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prospect of courts inquiring into whether law enforcement 
sufficiently tailored investigative methods would unduly “chill” 
law enforcement.297 
To the extent, however, that this argument rests on the 
assumption that courts applying heightened scrutiny to First 
Amendment profiling will routinely second-guess law 
enforcement decisions, that assumption is unwarranted. Even 
courts applying heightened scrutiny have sustained law 
enforcement practices where they credited law enforcement 
justifications for the necessity of a practice: heightened scrutiny 
in this context is not “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”298 Tabbaa, of 
course, sided with CBP’s determination that the security 
measures employed were necessary.299 Other judicial doctrines 
already protect law enforcement officers from second-guessing of 
reasonable decisions, including the idea that factual 
determinations of the executive branch are entitled to some 
deference300 and the qualified immunity defense in damages 
cases.301 The risk that heightened scrutiny for First Amendment 
profiling will lead to pervasive overturning of executive 
determinations is remote. Rather, the alternative rule of 
categorical deference to law enforcement justifications presents 
the more immediate risk—that even investigations significantly 
burdening speech or association, or aimed at the suppression of 
expression, will altogether escape First Amendment scrutiny. 
A third objection to heightened scrutiny is rooted in 
concerns over practical administrability. Specifically, this 
concern centers on the idea that law enforcement needs clear, 
consistent rules when making decisions about whom and how to 
interview, and that narrow tailoring requirements would force 
agencies (or even individual agents) to make complicated 
balancing calculations whenever a First Amendment interest is 
implicated. The Supreme Court itself has pointed to the need for 
“readily administrable rules” in law enforcement contexts, 
especially where decisions are made on the spot.302 Some courts 
and commentators have expressed concern that because the 
  
 297 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.) 
(per curiam), rev’d in part, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (Marshall, J.).  
 298 See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1513-16 (D. 
Ariz. 1990) (holding that the government demonstrated a “significant and intimate 
relationship between the conduct” and a compelling government interest when it 
secretly recorded a church’s services). 
 299 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 300 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010). 
 301 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 813, 819 n.34 (1982). 
 302 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
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First Amendment protects such a wide range of expression and 
association, heightened scrutiny requirements would force 
investigators to assess innumerable circumstances potentially 
implicating First Amendment rights.303 Such considerations 
might favor a clear rule holding law enforcement to account only 
for investigations without a legitimate purpose—and deferential 
review of such investigations rather than heightened scrutiny. 
Indeed, the distinction between overbreadth and 
permissible First Amendment profiling is contextual and fact-
specific, and therefore often complex.304 Law enforcement 
agencies can reduce the uncertainty by adopting more concrete 
guidelines to instruct officers on questioning decisions involving 
First Amendment concerns; the border officer charged with 
interviewing travelers would not be left alone to ruminate, in the 
heat of the moment, whether an interview would be “narrowly 
tailored,” but to implement practical agency rules devised in 
response to constitutional requirements.305 Although such 
guidelines would not eliminate line-drawing questions, they 
would reduce uncertainty for law enforcement agents. And the 
judicial doctrines discussed above, such as the qualified 
immunity defense, already protect officers from second-guessing 
of reasonable decisions. 
More fundamentally, a court’s decision to adopt a 
deferential bright-line rule to ensure “administrability” is at 
bottom a judgment that the interest in clarity trumps the harm 
to individuals potentially subject to abuses.306 It is unsurprising 
that decisions favoring clarity for law enforcement officers over 
competing liberty concerns often include language discounting 
the severity of the civil liberties problem at issue. Thus, the 
Laird Court declared full confidence that the political branches 
of government would remedy any actual abuses by the 
military,307 Branzburg opined that the press was not vulnerable 
  
 303 See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. &Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1059-
60 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 572 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated 
on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982).  
 304 See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
 305 In the border context, for instance, the CBP might impose stricter rules for 
interviews longer than a certain period of time or for inquiries into religious or political 
activities, such as requirements of individualized suspicion, advance supervisory approval, 
and consultation with agency counsel. Moreover, agency directives, such as the one at issue 
in Tabbaa, do not require spur-of-the-moment decisions by individual officers. 
 306 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 307 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972). 
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to abuse,308 and the Seventh Circuit court that dismantled the 
Chicago consent decree proclaimed that “[t]he era in which the 
Red Squad flourished is history.”309 Courts less sanguine about 
the tendency of law enforcement agencies to respect individual 
rights—and more attuned to the real stigmatic costs and chilling 
effects on communities subject to First Amendment profiling—
should rather conclude that meaningful judicial review is a 
necessary protection against government overreaching. 
CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement interviews in the terrorism context 
involve intrusion and stigma that the existing literature has 
not recognized or explored. As overt and highly personal 
encounters between individuals in the U.S. Muslim community 
and law enforcement, interviews can shape individuals’ and 
communities’ very sense of belonging. Where interviews result 
from First Amendment profiling, they are especially likely to 
stigmatize communities and chill First Amendment–protected 
expression and association. Moreover, such interviews carry a 
particular risk that improper considerations influenced the 
scope of the investigation, even where law enforcement did not 
intend to suppress speech. In light of the suppression and 
overbreadth concerns in investigations triggered by protected 
expression, I have argued that courts should apply heightened 
scrutiny to provide some accountability in FBI and CBP 
interviews—and that existing First Amendment doctrine 
provides a foundation for such review. 
First Amendment challenges in this context will not be 
easy for plaintiffs. Before a case even gets to court, individuals 
must overcome the chilling effects of interviews and submit 
themselves to the additional public exposure of a lawsuit. That 
chilling effect conundrum—those who are most chilled by an 
investigation are least likely to challenge it—will screen out a 
great many claims at the very outset. Those who do sue must 
establish standing according to the exceptions courts have 
carved out after Laird, convince a court to apply heightened 
scrutiny, and persuade the court not to defer to law 
  
 308 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972); see also Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (noting that the few reported searches of newspaper 
offices in the recent past “hardly suggests abuse”). 
 309 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353. 
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enforcement justifications on the facts of their case. They must 
also overcome additional barriers facing all civil rights 
plaintiffs, such as the Court’s new “plausibility” pleading 
standard310 and restrictive standing doctrine in claims for 
injunctive relief.311 
Even under these restrictive conditions, some plaintiffs 
challenging First Amendment profiling in interviews may 
prevail. Those with the greatest likelihood of succeeding, of 
course, are those who can establish significant harm with the 
least persuasive government justifications. Plaintiffs who can 
demonstrate a combination of stigma and chilling effects plus 
some further evidence of tangible harm stand the greatest 
chance. In the case of CBP interviews, lengthy detentions and 
additional screening measures at the border might suffice to 
establish such tangible harm. In the case of FBI interviews, 
such harm might include reputational or economic injuries 
incurred where law enforcement sought interviews in highly 
public contexts; where organizations were the target of 
numerous interviews conducted of other individuals; or where 
interviewees suffered additional consequences from First 
Amendment profiling, such as inclusion on a watch list, along 
with interviews. 
In addition, courts will be most persuaded by challenges 
to interviews where the relationship to actual security threats 
is so attenuated as to suggest law enforcement decision-making 
tainted by possible hostility or group-based generalizations—
even without a suppression purpose. While the court in Tabbaa 
declined to find for plaintiffs, the same court might have ruled 
for plaintiffs had the threat information been even weaker—
say, information that suspects might be gathering at Islamic 
conferences in general without any evidence pertaining to the 
particular conference in question. Similarly, courts might reject 
stigmatizing interviews triggered by political letters to the 
editor, statements in newspapers, or postings on a Facebook 
page, where there is no suggestion of violence. 
Although legal challenges to First Amendment profiling 
will not be easy, First Amendment freedom of speech and 
association doctrine offers potential redress for individuals 
subject to onerous interviews where there is strong evidence of 
law enforcement overreaching. 
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